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I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]here is often a divergence between what a person says and
what she means, between the meaning of the linguistic expression
she uses and the meaning she seeks to communicate by using it.”
–Robyn Carston1
“Meaning is inevitably dependent on context.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts2
“Pure applesauce.”
–Justice Scalia3
Two priests fluent in English and Latin live in a jurisdiction
where wild horses may be legally seized and sold.  The first priest
emails the second priest:  “If you seize the wild horse known as Sind,
1. ROBYN CARSTON, THOUGHTS AND UTTERANCES: THE PRAGMATICS OF EXPLICIT
COMMUNICATION 15 (2002).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
3. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In its
context, Justice Scalia no doubt gives “pure applesauce” the slang meaning of “pure
nonsense” rather than the standard meaning of “[a]pples stewed to a pulp and some-
times sweetened or spiced.” Applesauce, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 66
(3d ed. 1993).
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hold him for me, and send me notice that you have him, I’ll pay you
$1000.00.”  The second priest promptly seizes Sind, promptly puts him
in a holding pen for the first priest, and promptly emails the first
priest: “Peccavi,” which is gibberish in English but means “I have
sinned” in Latin.4  Does the first priest now owe the second priest
$1000.00?  Neither an English nor a Latin dictionary provides the an-
swer.  Instead, we would look for the answer in how we use (and even
make sport of) language.  Is the answer meant as a phonetic
equivalent (after translation) of “I have Sind”?  If so, does that count
as meeting the notice requirement?  Is it perhaps an even richer an-
swer of “I have sinned and have Sind”?  Each of these possibilities
shows us that speaker meaning can differ from linguistic meaning.
Since such divergence can occur, text alone is not going to give us any
kind of real-world answer to our contract question here.
Three lawyers have graduated from the same law school.  The
first lawyer emails the second lawyer asking whether he would recom-
mend the third lawyer’s firm to handle a certain complex legal matter.
He emails her back a one-sentence reply:  “Well, that firm generally
has pretty easy client parking for a downtown firm.”  In interpreting
this one-line answer as a proficient language user would, the second
lawyer does not limit herself to the text of the unasked parking ques-
tion.  She knows it would be a waste of her time to parse the words of
that text or look them up in a dictionary.  Instead, she notes the obvi-
ous failure to address the competence of the firm and takes this as a
polite non-recommendation of the firm.  She understands that in real-
world communication we value both relevance and politeness, i.e.,
that we want to be relevant but we also do not want to offend a mutual
friend.5  By grasping the interplay of these values, she makes sense of
this facially-irrelevant response.  In other words, she also realizes that
speaker meaning can diverge from linguistic meaning.
One person pens a letter to another.  The letter contains various
statements communicating the writer’s love for the addressee.  The
letter is mailed in an envelope covered with drawings of hearts and
the word “love.”  The sender uses a postage stamp picturing cupid and
mails the letter from a place called Great Love.  The envelope there-
fore bears a “Great Love” postmark.  In evaluating the “text” of the
letter, do we also include the envelope?  The postage stamp?  The post-
mark?  As this example shows, in addition to looking for meaning in
text, we must also look for and agree upon the extent of the text in any
4. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 36 (Harv. U. Press 1991).  This
example is a twist of one cited by Grice “the British General who captured the province
of Sind and sent back the message: Peccavi.” Id.  The use of “Way of Words” in the title
of this article is in homage to Grice.
5. See infra notes 77-83, 153-172, and accompanying text.
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case. Do we look for the text first and then turn to interpretation?  Or
can we really agree on the text without some understanding of the
meaning?  Would the question of including the stamp and the post-
mark arise if we did not consider this a love letter?  All this again
brings us back to what people do and find acceptable in the real world
of language use.
Turning to that real world, Congress has passed the Affordable
Care Act6 (the “ACA”) hoping to expand healthcare and lower costs.7
Among other provisions, Section 1311 of the ACA provides that states
“shall” set up “Exchanges” although Section 1321 recognizes that a
state may elect not to do so.8  Additionally, Section 1321 provides that
if a state does not elect to set up an Exchange, the Department of
Health and Human Services “shall . . . establish and operate such Ex-
change within the State[.]”9  Finally, Section 1401(a) of the ACA pro-
vides subsidies for coverage “enrolled in through an Exchange
established by the State under Section 1311[.]”10  Since no express
mention is made of federal Exchanges in the last provision, are subsi-
dies therefore available only for Exchanges set up by the states them-
selves?  Is the relevant text here just Section 1401 or are Sections
1311 and 1321 also part of the relevant text?  In any case, can text
alone give us an answer to this question or must we, as in the previous
examples, look beyond text to context and the way we actually use
language in the real world?  The Supreme Court has recently ruled
that subsidies are available for federal Exchanges.11  But does this re-
sult square with how language works in the real world?  We will re-
turn to this ACA example at various points throughout this article.12
As I have maintained in Exercising Common Sense,13 good legal
skills require knowledge of the humanities; the linguistic and philoso-
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
7. Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/key-features-of-aca/index.html. (Nov.
18, 2014).
8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311, 1321, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031,
18041 (2010).
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2010).
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
11. See Burwell, 131 S. Ct. at 2480.
12. See infra notes 203-214 and accompanying text.  I will provide a pragmatic
analysis (as that term is defined in Section II below) of the result rather than an analy-
sis of the reasoning involved in the opinion.  I hope to explore the opinion itself in a later
article.
13. Harold Anthony Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The In-
separability of Legal Theory, Practice and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1213 (2014).
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phy of language issues raised here provide a good example.14  Lawyers
and judges cannot adequately address the nature of text, meaning, or
interpretation without reference to the vast insights provided by lin-
guists and philosophers of language.  I hope this article will help move
more opinion in that direction and as a result lead to more sensible
lawyering and judging.
To this end, I will explore what linguists and philosophers of lan-
guage call “pragmatics” (i.e., how language works in use as more par-
ticularly defined below).15  I will provide an overview of the highlights
of such pragmatics thereby hoping to outline a basic toolbox needed to
perform pragmatic analysis of legal texts.  Not all the tools will be
needed in any particular case but knowledge of all such basic tools is
needed for any general fluency in pragmatics.  When I speak of “inter-
pretation” in the overview that follows, I speak of the process of deter-
mining meaning.16  As we will see time and again as we try to
determine meaning, speaker meaning can differ from linguistic mean-
ing and thus from the literal or more limited meaning of text.
II. “PRAGMATICS” DEFINED
By “pragmatics” I mean the study of how language users actually
use and interpret words and other signs in communication.17
Pragmatics thus focuses on “word-user relations” rather than upon
the “word-word” relations involved in syntax or the “word-world” rela-
tions involved in semantics.18  Instead, pragmatics studies speaker
performance and success in communication rather than a speaker’s
grammatical or terminological competence.19  In doing so, it focuses
on how language is used in context “to communicate a speaker’s
messages.”20  By “context” in general I mean “all the circumstances
14. See Linguistics, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 789 (3d ed. 1993).
Linguistics is “[t]he study of the nature and structure of human speech.” Id; see also THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 458 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).  Philosophy of lan-
guage “explores the relationships between ourselves and our language, and our lan-
guage and the world.” Id.
15. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. Section II below.
16. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 136 (Car-
olina Acad. Press 2006). In the context of statutes, interpretation “is the process by
which judges determine statutory meaning.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating “Interpretation of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.”).
17. Jacob. L. Mey, Pragmatics: Overview, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMAT-
ICS 786, 786 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009); Andries Bezuidenhout, Seman-
tics-Pragmatics Boundary, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS 875, 875 (Jacob. L.
Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
18. See Bezuidenhout, supra note 17, at 875.
19. See id.
20. See Mey, supra note 17, at 786; Bezuidenhout, supra note 17, at 913.  Following
Charles Morris, pragmatics and semantics are considered by many to be two of the
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that go into defining the backgrounds and goals of the interactants”
with the further understanding that context is dynamic and subject to
constant adjustment.21  I also introduce in Section VI of the Article
more specific types of context such as cognitive context; physical and
temporal context; social, cultural, and human context; discourse con-
text; textual or internal context; and purpose context.
For example, a speaker may not know how to conjugate a verb or
to use commas but may still effectively communicate.  Thus, the ad-
dressee of the love letter above might respond with this:  “I, ain’t never
lovin, you.”  Though a grammatical and syntactical mess, the phrase is
easily understandable, and parsing wording, double negatives, and
comma placement here would at best just lead to wasted time or con-
fusion.  Similarly, the attorney seeking advice in the law firm recom-
mendation example should understand the response as “not
recommended” even though “not recommended” is never said.  Explor-
ing instead the truth or falsity of the statement about parking would
also at best be either a waste of time or lead to confusion.
The pragmatic insight in both cases is that good communication
can happen with bad syntax, grammar, and even statements of ques-
tionable facial relevance.  The pragmatic challenge is both to grasp
how this happens and to resist the formalist temptation to force com-
munication into “proper” modes that change the communication’s
meaning.  It would be foolish, for example, to use a dictionary and
grammar book to render “I, ain’t never lovin, you” into an affirmation
of love.  An out of touch formalist could do that: a double negative is no
negative at all since “not not” must mean the absence of a not and
thus a negative.  I hope to avoid such foolish formalism and help
others do the same by first looking in more detail at discourse and text
pragmatics in general in Section III and by then turning to legal
pragmatics in more detail beginning with Section IV.
three subfields of semiotics (the study of signs) which also includes syntactics “which
studies the relations between a given sign vehicle and other sign vehicles.” Id. A “sign
vehicle” is “that which acts as a sign.” See WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 50
(Ind. U. Press 1990).  Charles Morris also defines syntactics as “the formal relations of
signs to one another.” Id. at 51.  I would further refine this to hold that syntactics stud-
ies the formal relations of signifiers, i.e., of those things which intentionally represent
something else. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals:
The Semiotics of Free Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 247 (2013) [hereinafter
Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals].
21. See Mey, supra note 17, at 786.
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III. DISCOURSE AND TEXT PRAGMATICS
“[W]ords, no matter how well chosen and correctly joined and pro-
nounced, do not convey the entire message, or even the major por-
tion of what we intend to say.”
–J. L. Mey22
“How every fool can play upon the word!”
–Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice23
Since law often involves discourse and since much of modern
pragmatics began with the discourse analyses of Paul Grice,24 it is
both useful and interesting to look at pragmatics in discourse before
focusing more purely on legal pragmatics.  I will thus briefly explore
how discourse, discourse meaning, and discourse interpretation work
in practice.
A. MESSAGE CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION
1. Discourse Stages
“Words are used as conventional symbols of mental states . . . .”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts25
“I’ll show my mind
According to my shallow simple skill.”
–Shakespeare, Two Gentlemen of Verona26
Building upon ideas of Alan Cruse, we can identify up to nine
“components or stages” of “a typical act of linguistic communication
involving a speaker and an addressee” and a text:
(i) The speaker normally has a purpose in communicating.
(ii) The speaker constructs a message to be communicated.
(iii) The speaker constructs an utterance with which to con-
vey the message.
(iv) The speaker transforms the utterance into a [text].
(v) The speaker transmits the [text].
(vi) The addressee receives the [text].
(vii) The addressee decodes the [text] to recover the
utterance.
22. See id. at 787.
23. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 5, line 39 (New
Pelican 313).
24. See generally GRICE, supra note 4.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
26. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA act 1, sc. 2, lines 7-8 (New
Pelican 117).
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(viii) The addressee reconstructs the message from the
utterance.
(ix) The addressee infers the purpose [and relevant full
meaning and effect] of the communication.27
To clarify a few points addressed or related to the above, by “mes-
sage” I mean that which the speaker wishes to communicate.  This
includes not only the proposition(s)28 the speaker wishes to communi-
cate but also “propositional attitudes” (such as whether the speaker
believes the proposition to be true or means it as a command, com-
plaint, warning, or some other sort of speech act29) and “expressive
meaning” which conveys “attitudes, or emotions with regard to the
things, people, or events, and so on referred to[.]”30  The message will
also communicate various levels of meaning about which I have writ-
ten elsewhere.31  By “utterance” here I mean “a piece of language pro-
duced on a particular occasion with a particular intent.  It may or may
not express a proposition[.]”32
To return to our law firm recommendation example, the ques-
tioned attorney and his response could fit these stages as follows: (i)
Purpose. The questioned attorney wants to convey with tact his disap-
proval of the law firm.  (ii) Message. His message is therefore that he
does not recommend the firm.  (iii) Utterance. He believes that an indi-
rect response will convey his message with tact, and he thinks that
mentioning no more than the firm’s parking availability will work as
27. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND
PRAGMATICS 5 (2011) (emphasis added).
28. Proposition, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 724 (Ted Honderich ed.,
1995).  By “proposition” I mean “what is asserted when a sentence . . . is used to say
something true or false, or what is expressed by such a sentence.” Id. (quotations omit-
ted).  By “sentence” I mean “a string of words constructed in accordance with the gram-
matical rules of some language and . . . [lacking] a truth value.” CRUSE, supra note 27, at
24.  Countless sentences can thus be used to express a single proposition: “It is snow-
ing,” “Il neige,” and so on.  By “statement” I mean “a sentence that is used to express a
proposition . . . [that] is presented as being true.” Id. at 24-25.  A sentence expresses a
proposition once the sentence actually refers to something real or hypothetical, i.e., if
“referring expressions in the sentence have been assigned referents[.]” Id. at 24.
29. Language serves more purposes than mere communication and is thus capable
of other “speech acts.”  For example, we can declare a meeting closed, and we can prom-
ise to pay $1000.00 for the capture and tender of the wild horse known as Sind.  Austin
and others have explored in great detail these additional functions of words. See, e.g., J.
L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa` eds., 2d ed.
1975).
30. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 6-7.  Utterances are “token-level” entities while
sentences are “type-level” entities. Id. at 25.  For example, if in referring to the same cat
and mat fifteen people say “The cat is on the mat,” there are fifteen utterances but only
one sentence. Id.
31. See, e.g., Harold Anthony Lloyd, Plane Meaning And Thought: Real-World Se-
mantics And Fictions of Originalism, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 657, 669-70 (2015)
[hereinafter Plane Meaning And Thought].
32. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 25.
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such an indirect response.  He therefore constructs this utterance in
his head: “Well, that firm generally has pretty easy client parking for
a downtown firm.”  (iv) Creation of Text.  To put his utterance in tangi-
ble and transmissible form, he types on his laptop “Well, that firm
generally has pretty easy client parking for a downtown firm.”  (v)
Transmission of text. He emails that text.  (vi) Receipt of text. The
other lawyer receives the email.  (vii) Decoding the text. By reading the
text, she “recover[s] the original form of the utterance as intended by
the speaker.”33  Since she can read and write, understanding this
clear text is not difficult.  However, there can be difficulties at this
stage such as textual ambiguity or transmission damage to text.34
(viii) Reconstructing the full message. This is a key stage recognized by
pragmatics.  As Cruse puts it, “[a]rguably the central task for the ad-
dressee is to work out the speaker’s message on the basis of the utter-
ance, taken together with relevant features of the context.”35  The
receiving lawyer here knows that the sending lawyer would not want
to offend their classmate and can see how tangential talk about park-
ing could convey disapproval in a safer way than an outright utter-
ance of disapproval.  She thus concludes the full message is one of
disapproval.  (ix) Determining the purpose, full meaning, and effect of
the communication. This is also a key stage in pragmatics.  The ad-
dressee now understands that the communication has succeeded in its
purpose of conveying disapproval in a safe and inoffensive way.  The
focus here is of course on the speaker meaning rather than on the lit-
eral meaning of the text.
2. Beyond Mere Code and Structure
“Gonzalo: You have spoken truer than you purposed.
Sebastian: You have taken it wiselier than I meant you should.”
–Shakespeare, Tempest36
“—I was just going to throw it away, Mr. Bloom said . . .
—What’s that?  [Bantam Lyons’] sharp voice said.
—I say you can keep it, Mr. Bloom answered.  I was going to throw
it away . . .
—I’ll risk it, [Bantam Lyons] said.”
–James Joyce, Ulysses37
33. Id. at 9.
34. See id. at 9-10.
35. Id. at 10.
36. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, lines 19-22 (New Pelican 743)
37. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 70 (Gabler ed., 1986).  Though Mr. Bloom refers to a
newspaper here, Bantam Lyons famously mistakes Bloom’s words to be a recommenda-
tion to bet on an underdog horse (“twenty to one . . . rank outsider”), Throwaway, in the
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Rather than simply being a process of coding and decoding,
human communication is thus achieved by a speaker giving evidence
of an intention to inform the hearer of something, and the hearer
hopefully correctly inferring a conclusion from this evidence.38  For ex-
ample, in the Joyce quotation above, the speaker intends to inform the
hearer that hearer can keep a newspaper that the speaker plans to
throwaway.  In this case the hearer unfortunately infers the wrong
message that the speaker is recommending a bet on the horse
Throwaway.39  At stage (viii) of the discourse, the hearer has improp-
erly focused on the similarity of “throw it away” to “Throwaway” to the
exclusion of other evidence such as “you can keep it” and the fact that
“throw it away” is not the same as “Throwaway.”
Similarly, as stage (viii) of the law firm recommendation example,
interpreting a text must involve more than merely “decoding” it.  It
involves looking at all of the relevant evidence, not just the words.  If
the addressee in the above example had stopped with merely recover-
ing the utterance from the text (stage (vii)), she would have misunder-
stood the message.  She would have wrongly interpreted the message
as positive review of a parking lot when in fact it was a negative re-
view of a law firm.  Instead of committing such a literalist error, she
looked at other relevant evidence beyond the words.  She considered
the fact that the three lawyers were classmates, the fact that the rec-
ommender would therefore not wish to hurt their classmate’s feelings,
and the likelihood that the parking lot reference was nonetheless rele-
vant to her inquiry despite its facial lack of great if any relevance.
Looking at all such evidence, she could reasonably conclude that by
dodging the direct question the parking lot statement was in fact a
polite vote of no confidence.  Beginning with Section IV below, we will
explore in more detail possible specific pragmatic rules supporting
such a conclusion.
Though we will explore these pragmatic rules in more detail be-
low, one can draw at least a couple of conclusions at this point.  First,
any structuralist theory holding that “[words] only acquire meaning
by virtue of their contrast with other [words] within a structure” must
be wrong.40  In our example, “Well, that firm generally has pretty easy
1904 Gold Cup. See id. at 192, 267, 274-75.  Throwaway actually won the race. See
Anthony Braime & Colin Younger, The Racing Stables at Westcourt, BURBAGE, WILT-
SHIRE, ENGLAND (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.burbage-wiltshire.co.uk/historic/Westcourt
Braime.htm.
38. Tim Wharton, Evolution of Pragmatics in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMAT-
ICS 253, 255 (Jacob L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
39. See JOYCE, supra note 37.
40. BRONWEN MARTIN & FELIZITAS RINGHAM, DICTIONARY OF SEMIOTICS 125 (Cas-
sell ed., 2000) (I substituted “word” for “element”).  “Structuralism” is an umbrella term
covering much more than what I have indicated and I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
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client parking for a downtown firm” carries meaning that has nothing
to do with the contrast of these words with other words within the
structure of the English language.  To the extent a literalist falls into
this kind of structuralist error, she also commits error.  To the extent
she refuses to look beyond words and consider non-linguistic matters
(such as politeness, which drives the response in the law firm recom-
mendation example), she will err.
Additionally, by focusing too much on the words before her, the
structuralist or literalist can have a false sense of security that she
has the real text.  As we saw above with our law firm and “Peccavi”
examples, determining the text in any case requires looking beyond
the words.  Furthermore, as Cruse notes:
Every mode of communication has a channel though
which the signal travels: for speech, we have the auditory
channel, for normal writing and sign language, the visual
channel, for Braille, the tactile channel, and so on.  As the
signal travels from sender to receiver, it alters in various
ways, through distortion, interference from irrelevant stim-
uli, or loss through fading.  These changes are collectively re-
ferred to as noise.  As a result, the signal picked up by the
receiver (the received signal) is never precisely the same as
the transmitted signal.41
I would also consider potential transmitter error (in language or
in transmission) as a form of such potential noise.  Although efficien-
cies in a communication system and the fact that language might be
“50 per cent redundant” can reduce the dangers of noise interfer-
ence,42 such noise exists.  Thus, a structuralist’s or literalist’s ignoring
such noise necessarily results in miscommunication in at least some
cases.
3. Discourse Rules and “Implicature”
“Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his at-
tendance at tutorials has been regular.  Yours, etc.”
–Paul Grice43
See, e.g., PAUL BOUISSAC, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMIOTICS 598-601 (Oxford U. Press 1998).
Instead, I focus on this particular formulation because of its parallels with textualism.
See infra Section IV(A).
41. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 9.
42. See id.
43. GRICE, supra note 4, at 33.  A hypothetical “writing testimonial about a pupil
who is a candidate for a philosophy job” which Grice believes conveys through its indi-
rection the “implicature” that “Mr. X is no good at philosophy.” Id.  The law firm exam-
ple given earlier of course parallels this example.
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“There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it
literally . . . .”
–Judge Hand44
Background rules also include rules governing the nature of dis-
course itself.  As we saw in the law firm recommendation example, the
addressee has taken as a negative recommendation the facially-com-
plimentary statement, “Well, that firm generally has pretty easy cli-
ent parking for a downtown firm.”  She does this by assuming that the
speaker gave a relevant answer notwithstanding its facial deviance
from the specific question, and by assuming that the speaker wanted
to respond in a polite way that did not insult their fellow former class-
mate.  In making the assumptions, she presupposes (in the sense of
background belief) that people in such discourse contexts try to be
both relevant and polite.  She also recognizes that relevant meaning
can differ from literal meaning.  In other words, she interprets the
language here as a non-recommendation to square the language with
her belief that the speaker would be both relevant and polite.
Like the lawyer in the example above, Grice recognizes that
“speaker meaning” (i.e., what a speaker actually means by his words)
may differ from the literal meaning of the words used.45  To account
for this difference, he analyzes speaker meaning both in terms of “lin-
guistic meaning and meaning in use.”46  When we look at meaning in
use, we consider what he calls “implicatures” arising from such use.
Speaker’s meaning involves both linguistic meaning (or “what is said”)
and “what is implicated.”47  What is “implicated” (called the “implica-
ture”) is “what is required to assume a speaker to think in order to
preserve the assumption that he is observing [the rules of discourse]
. . . if not at the level of what is said, at least at the level of what is
implicated.”48  In examining conversational implicature, Grice, like
the lawyer above, recognizes the role of relevance in implicature.49  He
also recognizes the role of politeness in implicature.50  However, he
also sets out a more complex background for implicature that contin-
44. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring).
45. See SIOBHAN CHAPMAN, PAUL GRICE: PHILOSOPHER AND LINGUIST 185 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2005).
46. Id.
47. See Jo¨rg Meibauer, Implicature in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS 365,
365 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
48. See GRICE, supra note 4, at 86.  For purposes of the example, I have replaced
his reference to “the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps some conversational maxims as
well).” Id.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 28.
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ues to drive debate today.51  Because much of the debate in pragmat-
ics has been about how to simplify Grice’s approach,52 a brief overview
of Grice’s thought is useful before we proceed further.
Grice begins with his “Cooperative Principle” and derives several
“Maxims” from it.  The Principle and the Maxims are set out as “rules
of rational behavior, not ethical norms.”53  The “Cooperative Princi-
ple” provides: “Make your conversational contribution such as is re-
quired, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”54  That is,
respond in a way that advances the goal of the conversation at the
particular stage involved.  Grice bases this principle upon his observa-
tion that discourse is not ordinarily “a succession of disconnected re-
marks” and that conversations are generally “cooperative efforts”
where “each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common
purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted
direction.”55
Grice supplements his Cooperative Principle with several maxims
which relate to the notion of cooperation.  The Maxim of “Quantity”
requires making “your contribution as informative as is required” for
“current [ ] purposes of the exchange” but not “more informative than
is required.”56  Being under or over-informative is of course not the
most efficient form of cooperation.  The other maxims similarly relate
on their face to efficient and good faith cooperation.  The Maxim of
“Quality” requires trying to make your contribution true.  This re-
quires not saying “what you believe to be false” and not saying some-
thing “for which you lack adequate evidence.”57  The “Maxim of
Relation” requires that one be relevant to the matter at hand.58  The
Maxim of “Manner” requires being “perspicuous” and thus avoiding
“obscurity of expression[,] avoid[ing] ambiguity[,] be[ing] brief[,] . . .
[and being] orderly.”59  Grice also recognizes that there are “all sorts
of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘Be
Polite,’ that are also normally observed in talk exchanges, and these
may also generate non[-]conventional implicatures.”60
51. See, e.g., CHAPMAN, supra note 45, at 185 (noting the wide and frequent citation
of Grice’s work).
52. See id. at 205.  “[M]ost responses to Grice have been reductive in tendency.” Id.
53. Meibauer, supra note 47, at 365; see also GRICE, supra note 4, at 30.
54. GRICE, supra note 4, at 26.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 28.
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Implicatures can be generated both by following and by flouting
the Principle and the various Maxims.61  For example, Grice believes
that the following exchange involves implicature though there is no
violation of the Principle or Maxims: “A: I am out of petrol.  B: There is
a garage around the corner.”62  If one assumes B follows the Maxim of
relevance, then in Grice’s sense B “implicates that the garage is, or at
least may be[,] open[.]”63  If being relevant, why else would he have
mentioned the garage?
On the other hand, the following implicate by flouting64 the Prin-
ciple and one or more of the various Maxims: A says: “Our country has
sacrificed too much in that war.”  B then says: “War is War.”65  On its
face a tautology, B’s response literally non-informatively says that
something is itself.  Since that is “totally noninformative” it “cannot
but infringe” the Maxim of Quantity.66  Grasping the implicated
meaning here is dependent upon the hearer’s “ability to explain the
speaker’s selection of this particular patent tautology.”67  Perhaps, for
example, the speaker meant, “There is nothing one can do about it.”68
As another flouting example:
A and his audience both know [that B has betrayed A] . . . .  A
says X is a fine friend . . . . [U]nless A’s utterance is entirely
pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposi-
tion than the one he purports . . . .  This must be some obvi-
ously related proposition; the most obviously related
proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be
putting forward.69
As noted earlier, much of the debate in pragmatics has been about
how to simplify Grice’s approach.70  In our law firm example, the ad-
dressee considered only politeness and relevance.  This suggests that
simplification is possible; “Relevance Theorists” similarly question
why Grice’s Principle and Maxims cannot be reduced and need to be
61. Id. at 30-37.
62. Id. at 32 (italics omitted).
63. Id.
64. See id. Maxims can be justifiably violated.  For example, A wants to visit his
friend in France and the following conversation ensues. “A: Where does C live?  B:
Somewhere in the South of France.” Id. (italics omitted).  B’s answer is not sufficient for
B’s travel plans and would thus seem to violate the maxim that one be as informative as
is required.  However, if B has no more precise answer than the one given, B would
violate the lack of evidence maxim if B gave a more precise answer. Id. at 32- 33.
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Meibauer, supra note 47, at 366.
69. GRICE, supra note 4, at 34. Grice gives a number of other flouting examples.
See, e.g., id. at 33-37.
70. See CHAPMAN, supra note 45, at 205.  Stating that “most responses to Grice
have been reductive in tendency.” Id.
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“maximally relevant on all salient parameters.”71  They also see the
notion of flouting maxims as paradoxical “when in every case a rele-
vant message ensues.”72  How can there be flouting when something
relevant results?  Additionally, Grice himself noted the importance of
politeness73 and others have gone on to explore and develop a “Polite-
ness Principle.”74  Our law firm recommendation example would seem
to echo all these points.  Was the example not driven by relevance and
politeness?  In the end was anything really flouted?  The recommender
gave what he felt was the most relevant response possible given his
politeness desires.  For purposes of exploring these questions further,
I shall use “relevant” in its ordinary sense of “[h]aving a bearing on or
connection with the matter at hand.”75  Relevance theorists develop
the term in much greater detail but I avoid that here out of space
concerns.76
B. PRINCIPLES OF RELEVANCE, POLITENESS, AND BALANCE
“[T]here is a single property—relevance—which makes informa-
tion worth processing for a human being.”
–Robyn Carston77
“The truth you speak doth lack some gentleness,
And time to speak it in.  You rub the sore
When you should bring the plaster.”
–Shakespeare, The Tempest78
71. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 433.
72. Id.
73. GRICE, supra note 4, at 28.
74. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 426-31.  This principle has been supplemented with
such suggested maxims as the “Tact Maxim,” the “Generosity Maxim,” the “Praise
Maxim,” the “Modesty Maxim,” the “Agreement Maxim,” the “Sympathy Maxim,” and
the “Consideration Maxim.” Id.  These maxims may well have application beyond lin-
guistics and philosophy of language studies.  Those who have difficulty with their social
skills might do well to study them. Psychologists dealing with patients suffering from
Asperger’s syndrome, for example, might find these guidelines useful material for in-
struction and for their patients.  Such psychologists might also have additional useful
insight into the maxims.
75. Relevant, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1152 (3d ed. 1993).
76. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 434.  For example, relevance theorists have ex-
plored a “cognitive principle of relevance” including two areas of inquiry:  (i) context
such as adding or strengthening information and (ii) considerations of “processing ef-
fort” where “the less effort it takes to recover a fact, the greater the relevance of the
fact.” Id.
77. CARSTON, supra note 1, at 45.
78. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, lines 137-39 (New Pelican
745).
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“[W]e must maximize the self-consistency we attribute to [others],
on pain of not understanding [them].”
–Donald Davidson79
This article will therefore take the working positions that, at the
most general level, (i) relevance and politeness are principal drivers of
conversational or discourse interpretation, and (ii) other principles
such as Grice’s Cooperative Principle can be seen as capturing nar-
rower aspects of these broader principles.  Grice’s Cooperative Princi-
ple requires one to contribute to conversation in such manner “as is
required[ ] at the stage at which [the contribution] occurs, by the ac-
cepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [one is] en-
gaged.”80  On their face, relevance and politeness together address
both what is required at the stage of discourse as well as the “accepted
purpose or direction” of the discourse.81  We can also note that the
relevance principle generally entails a principle of balance: if we as-
sume that a speaker means to be relevant, we by definition assume
that he does not generally mean to speak wrongly, irrationally, or in-
coherently even if his language can be interpreted as wrong, irra-
tional, or incoherent.82  This therefore means that we should
generally prefer a rational, and coherent meaning where possible un-
less we have strong reasons to believe otherwise.83  As we go on to
explore pragmatics in legal texts, we will explore what light these
principles of discourse may shed upon interpretation of legal texts.
79. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 27 (Oxford U.
Press 1984).
80. GRICE, supra note 4, at 26.
81. Id.
82. See DAVIDSON, supra note 79, at 27.  Where language on its face does not seem
to permit a rational, and coherent meaning, one should always consider context as well
as the possibilities of indirect encoding or encoding error. See infra Sections III(D),
VII(A); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(stating that “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning
to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, un-
lawful, or of no effect.”).
83. KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCI-
PLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 82 (Oxford U. Press 2010).  As Kent Greenawalt elegantly
puts it:
What I would hope from an interpreter [who has found statements that seem
contradictory or at odds with the remainder of a piece] is that if she could fig-
ure out which statement did fit my overall position best and which reflected a
lapse in how I have expressed myself, she would say, Greenawalt probably
means X (or would think X) though one of his sentences points in a different
direction.
Id.
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C. MESSAGE CLARIFICATION AND ELABORATION
“We need more light to find your meaning out.”
–Shakespeare, Love’s Labor’s Lost84
In addition to cases where the relevant meaning differs from what
is actually said (as in the law firm hypothetical), the words used in a
given case may not fully capture what is actually said.85  Take the
following exchange: A: “I’ll draft the brief.”  B: “The file is on the top
shelf.”  A: “I can’t see it.”86  We can clarify from the context that “file”
refers to “case file” rather than a nail file or some other kind of file.
Though the phrase “case file” is not used, it is part of what is said
since it is subsumed under the word “file.”  Additionally, the “it” is
ambiguous: does it refer to the case file or to the shelf?  Though we will
need further clarification, the resulting answer is again part of what
the speaker said since it is subsumed under the use of the word “it.”
Take another example: “The deposition transcripts were heavy and he
dropped them.”87  Presumably the speaker means to convey some-
thing like, “The deposition transcripts were heavy and because of that
he dropped it.”88  Such elaboration of what is actually said is impor-
tant because it will avoid potential misunderstanding.  Perhaps the
speaker simply meant to conjoin two facts with no opinion on any con-
nection.  If so, elaboration will flesh this out: “I’m not sure why he
dropped those heavy deposition transcripts.”
D. DIRECTION AND COMPASS
“[T]hey did perform
Beyond thought’s compass . . . .”
–Shakespeare, Henry VIII89
“But it would cut § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to
hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or
significance, destroyed with obstructive intent.”
–Justice Ginsburg90
84. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, LOVE’S LABOR’S LOST act 5, sc. 2, line 21 (New Pelican
236)
85. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 435.  Cruse uses the term “explicature” to cover “all
the propositions that are explicitly communicated by the speaker through [an] utter-
ance.” Id.  Three aspects of explicature include resolving ambiguities, assigning refer-
ences, and “enrichment” or “fleshing out.” See id. at 435-38.
86. See id. at 436.
87. See id. at 438.
88. Id.
89. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VIII act 1, sc. 1, lines 35-36 (New Pelican 1172).
90. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., majority).
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Up to this point, among other things, we have seen that speaker
meaning includes both what was said and what Grice would call “im-
plicatures” or “the implicated,” that interpreters should consider all
relevant evidence in determining what is said and what Grice would
say is implicated, that principles of relevance and politeness help in
such determinations in the case of discourse, that what is said can
need clarification and elaboration, and that relevant entailments also
need consideration.
In the spirit of plainer English, of greater precision, and of not
making what I see as a possible category mistake, I will drop the use
of “implicature” going forward.  Instead, I will use the plainer English
terms of “direct” and “not direct” in the case of coding and decoding
and “compass/encompass” in the case of meaning or message to cap-
ture two very different linguistic matters which I believe Grice would
cover with “implicature.”
In our law firm recommendation example, the speaker’s real
meaning or message is not directly encoded in, “That firm has pretty
easy client parking for a downtown firm.”  Instead, the speaker’s real
message (more directly encoded as “I do not recommend that firm”)
must be inferred as discussed above from the context and from as-
sumptions of relevance and politeness.  In other words, the real mes-
sage is indirectly encoded in the text.  In drawing our indirect
inferences, we are thus at stages (vii) and (viii) of Cruse’s outline dis-
cussed in Section III(A) above, i.e., we are at the stages of decoding
and reconstructing the message.
Grice’s “implicature” also covers situations arguably categorically
different from the decoding and message reconstruction discussed
above.  Take again, the following example of Grice’s “implicature”: “A:
I am out of petrol.  B: There is a garage around the corner.”91  If one
assumes the response is relevant, then B probably meant to direct the
addressee to “an open or likely-open garage.”92  However, unlike the
law firm example where the real message is certainly not directly en-
coded, here one could reasonably maintain that it is.  Perhaps the
message is directly encoded in the phrase and the question thus be-
comes what is encompassed within the meaning of the message.  Per-
haps the speaker meant no more than garage though he knew that
that garage was open or likely open.  If so, then the question is cate-
gorically different from a question that involves coding and decoding.
It is instead a question about the scope of a part of the speaker’s mes-
sage, i.e., it involves stage (ii) of Cruse’s outline rather than stages
(vii) and (viii).
91. GRICE, supra note 4, at 32.
92. See id.
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Of course, the speaker might also have meant to convey the ex-
press message, “There is an open or likely-open garage around the cor-
ner” which he then imprecisely encoded in, “There is a garage around
the corner.”93  If so, that would involve stages (vii) and (viii) of Cruse’s
outline.  The point is, regardless, that good theory must be able to dif-
ferentiate these categorically different possibilities.
Dispensing with “implicature,” I will therefore speak of “direct”
and “indirect” in the case of decoding and message reconstruction, and
I will speak of compass in the case what the speaker’s message means,
embraces, or refers to.94  (The pointing sense of “compass” as well as
its sense of range or scope make “compass” a better term for use here
than “scope” or “range” alone.)95  As for the notion of indirect coding,
such indirection can be quite extreme even to the point of contradic-
tion of the literal text—irony would be an example of such an
extreme.96
IV. INTERPRETING LEGAL TEXTS: STARTING POINTS
A. “TEXTUALISM” DEFINED
“I pray thee understand a plain man in his plain meaning.”
–Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice97
“It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the
plain meaning of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain
except in a context.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts98
By “textualism” I mean the “interpretive theory that requires the
judge to rely on the text to the exclusion of other interpretive criteria,
if the meaning is ‘plain.’”99  Though we can dispute whether meaning
is ever “plain,” like Popkin, I will use “plain” to mean “common under-
standing.”100  Though we can also dispute whether there is a common
understanding in any case, this approach at least requires us to con-
sider the “[a]uthor and audience” of a text and how they interrelate in
93. Id.
94. See supra Section III(B); see infra Section VI.  Because, for example, context as
well as relevance and politeness principles play a large role in reconstructing messages,
cases of direct encoding may not be as common as one might first imagine.
95. Compass, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford U. Press 2015).
96. See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 92 (2d ed. 1991).
Irony is “[i]mplying a meaning opposite to the literal meaning.” Id.
97. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 5, lines 50-51 (New
Pelican 313).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
99. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 263.
100. Id. at 264.
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practice.101  Under such “textualism,” one takes a “linear” approach to
interpretation.  One starts with the text and only considers matters
outside the text if the text is unclear.102  In other words, one should
proceed as follows:  (1) One must attempt to follow the plain meaning
of the text.103  (2) However, if the meaning is not plain (because of
ambiguity, vagueness or perhaps some other reason), one must at-
tempt to apply canons of construction “that are intrinsic to legal
texts.”104  These are canons that turn on the text itself such as the
canons that “Every word must be given effect,” “A specific provision
controls a general one,” and “Grammar and punctuation are assumed
to follow approved usage.”105  (3) If the steps above have not clarified
the text, then one may turn to “evidence outside of the text itself.”106
Such evidence includes evidence involving the “social context of the
document, writing of the document, and implementation.”107  For ex-
ample, customary trade usage can provide context in contract dis-
putes, legislative committee reports can provide evidence relating to
the drafting of a statute, and performance can provide evidence of con-
tract implementation.108
In applying these three steps, the interpreter must be guided by
reason and not reach an unreasonable result.109  Thus, textualism in
the sense discussed above should not be confused with literal or
“grammatical” interpretation “based exclusively on the words them-
selves,”110 “without adequate attention to the way authors write and
audiences understand language,”111 and without adequate attention
to rationality itself.112  Though a literal approach might interpret, “I,
ain’t never lovin, you” as an affirmation of love due to the double nega-
tive, the textualist would not because she would consider the common
meaning of “ain’t never” and because she knows her interpretation
must be reasonable.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 193.
103. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME 5 (Carolina Acad. Press 2008).
104. See id. at 11-12.
105. Id. at 11 (italics omitted).  These are only three of the canons from a more ex-
haustive listed cited by Benson. Id.  However, as Benson also notes, competing canons
can arguably apply in given situations so that their real guidance, if any, can be ques-
tionable at best. See id. at 37-39.  For example, as noted above, “Grammar and punctua-
tion are assumed to follow approved usage;” however, it is also recognized that “Courts
are not bound by grammatical rules.” Id. at 37 (internal quotes omitted).  Benson pro-
vides a very useful table of such conflicting canons. Id. at 37-39
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 12-16.
109. Id. at 16-18.
110. Grammatical Interpretation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
111. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 194.
112. BENSON, supra note 103, at 16-18.
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Why be a textualist?  If we can, starting with the text of course
makes sense.  If we are going to review a contract or a statute, how do
we begin that review without starting with the applicable text?  Addi-
tionally, to the extent we deviate from the text are we not changing
the text rather than interpreting it?  Put another way, are we not
changing the likely meaning of what someone said if we do not stick to
the general understandings of terms at the time the person has used
the word?113
Interestingly, these questions upon a bit of further thought actu-
ally make us question textualism.  First, as we shall see in Section
IV(B) below, delineation of text cannot be clearly separated from its
interpretation.  As such, one cannot sensibly say text clearly precedes
interpretation so that we can ever truly simply start with text.  Sec-
ond, as discussed in Section IV(B)(2)(a), the “text” we have in a given
case may not be the true text and we are changing the true text if do
not make a change in the faulty “text” that we have.  How can we
make this change if we can only look at the text before us?  Third, as
noted in Sections III(D), VI, and VII(A), the real message (because of,
for example, context or indirect or improper encoding) may indeed dif-
fer from the literal textual language and we would be changing the
message if we did not deviate from that literal language.  As Popkin
notes: “Textualism does not tell you how broadly or narrowly to define
the text; who is the author or audience; whether the author’s or the
audience’s understanding prevails in the case of disagreement; and
(most important of all) what context helps to decide textual
meaning.”114
Addressing Popkin’s first point above, how do we determine the
operative text?  In private law, for example, we might ask whether a
contract includes correspondence or emails permitting as amend-
ments some variation of the terms provided in the initial contract.115
In the letter example given above, we might similarly debate, again,
whether the envelope is part of the text.  Following up on Popkin’s
first question, once we determine the operative text, how do we deter-
113. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 267.  There are also other reasons one might give.
For example, in the case of judging, one might believe that departing from plain mean-
ing: “discourages legislative responsibility for making decisions and for drafting care-
fully,” “unsettles the law, discouraging private planning and encouraging too much
administrative and judicial discretion,” and “gives judges more discretion than they can
intelligently handle.” Id.
114. Id. at 264.
115. See, e.g., Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., 854 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(holding that an employee’s email accepting a proposed modification to an employment
contract constituted a “signed writing” and thus satisfied the contracts “No Oral Modifi-
cation” Clause).  In response, some attorneys have begun using so called “No Email
Modification” Clauses. See Stephanie Holmes, Stevens v. Publicis: The Rise of “No E-
mail Modification” Clauses?, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 67 (2010).
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mine the relevant part of the text?  Again, in the ACA example above,
we might ask whether the relevant text is just Section 1401 or
whether it includes Sections 1311 and 1321 as well.  In neither of
these contract or ACA cases is the text simply given to us to review.
We first have to determine what constitutes the text and then deter-
mine which part is relevant to our current inquiry.  To do either such
thing, we must have a general understanding of what “text” means.
B. FINDING OPERATIVE TEXT
1. Defining “Text”
For purposes of this article, I define text as “the original wording
of written works, including without limitation, constitutions, statutes,
regulations, orders, contracts, wills, and other documents and instru-
ments.”116  I would also consider the term to cover, without limitation,
literary and religious works as well as drawings or diagrams within
works.117  This broad definition of text will be more useful than nar-
rower ones for the discussions that follow.  Such narrower definitions
might, for example, distinguish between the text of a book and “its
immediately surrounding material” such as footnotes.118  Though this
narrower definition can be useful when distinguishing parts of a page,
it misses the deeper commonality that such narrower “text” and foot-
notes share.  As explored below, they are a cohesive set of words and
phrases to be read and understood together.
Though this broader definition provides a start, it still does not
fully address part of the love-letter problem.  Where does a text begin
and where does it end?  What do we include and what do we exclude?
Is some text included but qualitatively different from other text?  If so,
how do we make that determination?  For example, although the Pre-
amble of the Constitution is written with the body of the Constitution,
116. I have synthesized this definition from definitions provided by legal works such
as Popkin and from common usage. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 263 (stating, “In the
context of statutory interpretation, ‘text’ means the language of a statute whose mean-
ing the judge must interpret”); see, e.g., Text, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
1403 (3d. ed. 1993) (defining as “[t]he original words of something written or printed, as
opposed to a paraphrase, translation, revision, or condensation,” and “[a] passage from a
written work used as the starting point of a discussion”).
117. For purposes of this article, I wish to keep “text” narrow in the sense of having
some connection to a written work.  However, I recognize that texts often include, for
example, drawings and diagrams that are integral to their meanings.  Outside the con-
text of this article, I take no position on whether paintings or other non-written matters
can be considered a text. See, e.g., G. J. Stein, Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches in CON-
CISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS 610-11 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009)
(discussing whether a text might be anything that can be interpreted).  I also fully rec-
ognize that signifiers need not be words. See Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals,
supra note 20, at 282-83.
118. Stein, supra note 117, at 609.
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it is generally said that the Preamble has less if any weight as law.119
Similarly, contract recitals are often said to be not binding.120  In try-
ing to answer these questions, it will help to focus on the role “work”
plays within the definition of “text.”  What is a work?
In its ordinary sense here, a “work” involves “[s]omething . . . pro-
duced or accomplished through the effort, activity, or agency of a per-
son or thing.”121  Producing or accomplishing something suggests
activity to some end.  This is consistent with the Latin root of text,
texere (to weave).122  Weaving, too, generally has a purpose (creation
of a blanket or a sweater for example), and this is also consistent with
the first stage of Cruse’s nine stages of discourse: “the speaker nor-
mally has a purpose in communicating.”123  If we think of a text as a
work woven together for some purpose, we can ask ourselves what de-
fining characteristics might exist for a text.  Since the parts of some-
thing woven are intertwined, interrelatedness or internal cohesion
provides a good first textual characteristic to examine.  That can be
followed by examining in more detail the notion of purpose that work
and weaving suggest.
2. Finding Possible Text Through Cohesion
“One cannot rest content with ‘deconstructing’ a will to show that it
lacks meaning or contains contradictory meanings; one needs to
decide what the will does and does not do.”
–Kent Greenawalt124
Taking interrelatedness first, if threads lying beside a blanket are
not woven into the blanket, they are not part of the blanket.  If
threads of words are not woven into a text, they are not part of the
text.  Of course, it is easy to see unwoven threads in the case of blan-
kets but what does it mean for words to be “unwoven” in the case of a
text?  For purposes of this article, I shall consider words not to be wo-
ven into the text if such words lack intentional, structural, conceptual,
context, or other background “cohesion” with the text.125  In this
119. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 13 (1905) (stating, “Although that
preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established
the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power . . .
[s]uch powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution[.]”).
120. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 218(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(stating, “A recital of a fact in an integrated contract may be shown to be untrue”).
121. Work, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1544 (3d ed. 1993).
122. Text, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1403 (3d ed. 1993).
123. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 5; see supra Section III(A).
124. GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 73.
125. Others would take a somewhat more complex approach.  For example, Robert
de Beaugrand would, in Winfried Noth’s words, have at least seven (7) criteria: “(surface
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sense, cohesion is “the process whereby sentences or utterances are
linked together to form a text.”126  For purposes of this article, I do not
exclude “background knowledge and context” from “cohesion”; I find it
confusing to use “coherence” to cover such cases since, among other
things, a writer’s background knowledge might not be fully consistent
with the text but she still might intend inclusion in the text.127  For
example, I know that my car is not a horse but I can intend that the
metaphorical sentence, “My car is a workhorse” be included as a part
of a text about my car.
I will briefly examine here each of the five types of cohesion.  A
number of the notions briefly addressed here will be more fully devel-
oped as the article progresses.  As the following examples show, a
given text may have multiple types of cohesion.  Also, as will be seen
in the last example, cohesion may both exist and be ruled out depend-
ing upon the standard used.
a. Intentional Cohesion
An intentional mental state is a mental state that represents or is
otherwise directed at something else.128  For example, if I believe
“that the King of France is bald,” my belief is intentional because it is
directed beyond itself to a real or fictional king.129  In addition to be-
lief, intentional states include, among many other things, desire.130
Taking this understanding of intentionality, I use “intentional cohe-
sion” to refer to an author’s belief or desire (or both) that certain of his
written words constitute a singular text.  Thus, if Thomas Hardy de-
livers a manuscript entitled “Jude the Obscure” to his publisher and
indicates his belief or desire (or both) that these pages constitute a
singular text, that manuscript has intentional cohesion as I use the
term.  One can also approach intentional cohesion from a performative
angle since functions of language include directives (trying to get peo-
ple to do things) and declarations (trying to “bring about changes in
the world with our utterances”).131  Along these lines we might thus
speak of the author’s directing us to treat a manuscript as one text or
as declaring that a manuscript is one text.
structural) cohesion, (conceptual) coherence, intentionality, acceptability, situationality,
intertextuality, and informativity.” NOTH, supra note 20, at 333.
126. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 35.
127. See id. at 36 (noting the distinction between “coherence” and “cohesion”).
128. See JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
MIND, 1, 24 (Cambridge U. Press 1983).
129. See id. at 4.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 166.
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Intentional cohesion can prove both difficult and easy to deter-
mine.  If there is clear authorial intent and a clear chain of transfer of
clear pages from author to publisher, intentional cohesion can easily
weave together into one text language that might fail to have other
sorts of cohesion discussed below.  For example, many may find it dif-
ficult to see any surface cohesion in language such as, “Send us bright
one, light one, Horhorn, quickening and wombfruit” from Joyce’s
Ulysses,132 but will not find it difficult to find the language part of a
text if they know that Joyce wished or believed it to be part of such a
text.
However, such intentional cohesion can also be difficult to prove
and can in fact generate much controversy.  Keeping with Ulysses, be-
cause of uncertainty in manuscripts, scholars debate (among many
other passage debates) whether one passage should read, “Yes. No.” or
“Nes. Yo.” and whether a passage involving a telegram should read,
“Mother dying come home father” or “Nother dying come home fa-
ther.”133  (These particular examples also involve potential encoding
errors discussed in Section VII(A) below.)  The mechanics and theories
of how one might determine and hold “stable through time” “the actual
words” or the “original” words134 of Joyce or other authors go beyond
the scope of this article.135
b. Referential Cohesion
Referential cohesion occurs where the language used across a text
refers to the same thing.136  Such reference can be general or specific.
General reference involves overarching reference that unifies a text.
For example, on its face a will can be said to have textual unity in the
sense that it generally refers to the distribution of a certain estate.
Specific reference, on the other hand, involves “smaller linguistic
units” with the same “referent throughout the text.”137  Such specific
reference would include, for example, pronouns that refer back to pre-
viously used nouns.138  Specific reference is discussed in more detail
below in Section VII(E) on anaphora and cataphora.
132. JOYCE, supra note 37, at 314.
133. Id. at xi.
134. See BOUISSAC, supra note 40, at 609.
135. See, e.g., THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY & CRITICISM 708-14
(Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, & Irme Szeman eds., 2nd ed. 2004) (laying out an
overview of “principles for the scholarly editing of the texts of the cultural heritage.”).
136. T. Sanders & J. Sanders, Text and Text Analysis, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PRAGMATICS 1075, 1077 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009)
137. Id. at 1077.
138. See id.
246 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
c. Relational and Formal Cohesion
Relational cohesion occurs where “text segments” are related by
“connectives and (other) lexical markers of relations.”139  Such rela-
tions include “cause-consequence,” “problem-solution,” temporal con-
nection, and conjunction.140  Words suggesting such relational
cohesion include “because, so, however, although,” “for that reason, as
a result, [and] on the other hand”141 as well as “and,” “but,” “neverthe-
less,” “however,” “firstly,” “then,” “next,” and “while.”142  I use formal
cohesion to refer to titles, headings, sections, numbering, and other
devices that suggest textual unity.143
d. Contextual Cohesion
Contextual cohesion occurs when the context suggests unity.144
For example, a novelist may have two boxes on his desk: one labeled
“finished chapters” and one labeled “rejected chapters.”  If the novelist
dies before completion of the novel, his executor could make some rea-
sonable contextual conclusions about the text.  In the absence of con-
tradictory evidence (such as the house cleaner’s jumbling the boxes),
the executor could reasonably consider those chapters in the box la-
beled “finished chapters” to be chapters of the novel in progress, and
he could reasonably reject those chapters in the box labeled “rejected
chapters.”  Context is discussed in more detail in Section VI below.
e. Other Background Cohesion
I use “other background cohesion” to include cohesion coming
from other background criteria brought by the interpreter not covered
in the previous four types of cohesion.  For example, in determining
whether an appendix is part of a brief filed before a court, a careful
lawyer will read the applicable rules of court.  If the rules provide that
briefs may not have appendices or that appendices cannot use the spe-
cific font used by the appendix under analysis, the appendix will not
be part of the text of the brief under those rules and will thus lack that
background cohesion if filed in that court.  This is true even though an
author who has not read the rules intends that the appendix be part of
his brief and even though the brief has formal cohesion such as includ-
139. Id.
140. See id.; see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 35-36, 41.
141. Sanders & Sanders, supra note 136, at 1077 (emphases omitted).
142. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 41.
143. Such items expressly “enable the writer/speaker to establish relationships
across sentence or utterance boundaries and . . . help link the different parts of the text
together.” Id. at 35.
144. Various types of context are discussed in detail. See infra Section VI.
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ing the appendix in the table of contents.  Other forms of background
are discussed in more detail in Section VI below.
f. Purpose as Arbiter When Cohesion Factors Conflict
As the brief and appendix example above shows, where purpose
can be ascertained,145 it can determine the limits of text where vari-
ous cohesion criteria conflict.  If the writer’s purpose is to prepare and
file a brief the court will accept, then the background rules of court
will trump authorial intent and the appendix will not be part of the
brief.  However, if the writer’s purpose is to draft a brief for his own
enjoyment or for some other purpose, then the background rules
would not trump authorial intent and the appendix would be part of
the brief.  This example demonstrates two points.  First, purpose and
intent can diverge.  Second, purpose (where ascertainable) is a power-
ful arbiter of textual disputes.
g. Simply Starting With Text Is Thus Impossible Unless Arbitrary
“That man was not a thinker, he felt no need of getting beyond
faith.”
–Søren Kierkegaard146
Since, as just discussed, we use intent, reference, relation, form,
context, other background, and purpose to define text; we therefore
cannot simply begin with “the text” unless we just take it as a matter
of faith or dogma that we have “the text.”  We cannot, for example,
determine that a particular contract comprises only four pages unless
we have already to some degree interpreted the text by looking at any
intent, reference, relation, form, context, other background, and pur-
pose that make it a text.  Any such “text” handed to us may comprise
four pages but review might well show that one page is an unrelated
invoice or that a number of pages are actually missing.  Not only must
interpretation involve more than text: text itself cannot be determined
unless we look beyond the words for the necessary cohesion.
3. Finding Relevant Text Through Cohesion
The second initial question that textualism ignores is just which
part of the text is relevant.  In private law, for example, we may have
parties debating whether a lease “implies” an obligation for the tenant
to operate continuously even though the lease does not expressly con-
145. Determining purpose involves both the questions of whose purpose governs and
what that purpose might be.  These questions are of course not always easily answered.
146. SøREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 36
(Walter Lowrie trans., 2013).
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tain such a provision.147  Since the text is silent on this issue, which
part of the text should govern the possible implication of a covenant?
Should it be the use provision where no such obligation is set forth?
Should that end the matter?  Or should we look at other provisions
such as base and other forms of rent to see what the parties might
have intended to the extent use might be tied into these matters?
Nothing in the text tells us what is relevant here.  Instead, we must
look at the underlying factors discussed in Section IV(B)(2) above that
make the lease a text: its purpose and its intentional, structural, con-
ceptual, and contextual cohesion.  This will include looking at the ap-
plicable law and at what we think the parties may have intended.
The ACA provides a public law example.  In determining whether
subsidies are available in states without state exchanges, the words
alone do not tell us what parts of the Act are relevant and what parts
are not, a fact that the Supreme Court wrestled with in King v.
Burwell.148  Again, Section 1311 of the ACA provides that states
“shall” set up “Exchanges” although Section 1321 recognizes that a
state may elect not to do so.149  Additionally, Section 1321 provides
that if a state does not elect to set up an Exchange, the Department of
Health and Human Services “shall . . . establish and operate such Ex-
change within the State.”150  Finally, Section 1401 of the ACA pro-
vides subsidies for coverage “enrolled in through an Exchange
established by the State under Section 1311 . . . .”151  Do we look just
at Section 1401 where no express mention is made of subsidies where
federal exchanges are involved?  Or must we also consider Sections
1311, 1321, and perhaps other sections (as well as the ACA’s goals of
expanding healthcare access and decreasing costs152) to determine the
entire context for the question?  The mere words of the Act do not an-
swer this question.  Instead, we must look at the underlying factors
discussed above in this Section IV(B) that make it a text: its purpose,
reference, relation, form, context, and other background.  In other
words, to find answers we cannot simply “start with the text.”
147. See Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 779 (Cal. 1955) (citing
Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 113 P.2d 878, 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941))
(laying out the factors for implying a duty of continuous operation on the tenant when a
retail lease is silent).
148. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  Again, I do not explore
the Court’s reasoning in this article but rather address the general pragmatics of the
problems raised in the case.
149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311, 1321, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031,
18041 (2010).
150. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2010).
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
152. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311, 1321, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 18031, 18041 (2010); see also Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 7.
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4. Interpretation As Both Precedent and Subsequent to Text and
Considerations of Text
Interpretation thus precedes both text itself and considerations of
any purported relevant textual provisions.  To determine whether we
even have a text we must, again, search for any cohesion of intent,
reference, relation, form, context, other background, and purpose that
might indicate the existence of a text.
V. INTERPRETING LEGAL TEXTS: STAGES, RELEVANCE,
POLITENESS, AND BALANCE
A. STAGES AND VARIATIONS
Once we have determined the extent of a text and its relevant
provisions, we can go on to interpret these provisions.  In doing so, as
discussed in Section III above, we must remember to consider all the
relevant stages involved in formulating and conveying a message or
other meaning.  Setting out these stages in prototypical individual,
corporate, and legislative form will provide helpful insights as we go
forward.
In the case of text created by an individual, we can work with the
variation of Cruse’s stages set out in Section III above.  For example,
in examining a holographic will, we can assume the following stages
from testator to us:
(i) The testator has a purpose in communicating.
(ii) The testator constructs a message to be communicated.
(iii) The testator constructs an utterance with which to convey
the message.
(iv) The speaker transforms the utterance into a will.
(v) The speaker transmits the will.
(vi) The addressee receives the will.
(vii) The addressee decodes the will to recover the utterance.
(viii) The addressee reconstructs the message from the utterance.
(ix) The addressee infers the purpose and relevant full meaning
and effect of the communication.153  This will focus on a de-
termination of the testator’s meaning.
In the case of text created by a corporation, we would either use
the form of the above nine stages or a variation.  If a single agent
makes a determination and acts on behalf of the corporation, the form
of the above nine stages should work since an individual is performing
the communication:
153. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 5.
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(i) The corporation through its agent has a purpose in
communicating.
(ii) The corporation through its agent constructs a message to
be communicated.
(iii) The corporation through its agent constructs an utterance
with which to convey the message.
(iv) The corporation through its agent transforms the utterance
into a text.
(v) The corporation through its agent transmits the text.
(vi) The addressee receives the text.
(vii) The addressee decodes the text to recover the utterance.
(viii) The addressee reconstructs the message from the utterance.
(ix) The addressee infers the purpose and relevant full meaning
and effect of the communication.154  This will focus on a de-
termination of the agent’s meaning.
However, if the board of directors, for example, communicates on
behalf of the corporation, we no longer have an individual action that
fits in the above model.  We would therefore need to tweak the model
to give it real-world application:
(i) The corporation through its board of directors considers a
matter.
(ii) The corporation through its board of directors considers a
message related to the matter.
(iii) The corporation through its board of directors considers an
utterance with which to convey the message.
(iv) The corporation through its board of directors transforms an
utterance into text.
(v) The corporation through its board of directors publishes the
text.
(vi) A third party receives the text.
(vii) A third party decodes the text to recover the utterance.
(viii) A third party reconstructs the message from the utterance.
(ix) A third party infers the matter addressed by the message
and the message’s relevant full meaning and effect.155
This approach avoids use of any common purpose of the board
members.  Since the board members may have divergent purposes to a
common end, any such approach is at best problematic.156  However,
154. Id.
155. See id. (setting out a discourse model from which this is adapted).
156. For example, each member of a three-member board may have different rea-
sons for approving a change to the name of the corporation: the name has negative
connotations, the name is great but is easily confused with a competitor’s, and the new
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the term “consider” has a procedural meaning which avoids such
problems.  To “consider” something, the board must follow a process
recognized by its charter, bylaws, and applicable law—in other words,
it must take objective action.157  Because of the lack of a single
speaker meaning here, I would suggest that we seek a “best reading”
of a text so generated.
In the public law context, we would need to do something similar
to the board of directors’ situation with a corporation.  For example, in
the case of a legislature we can look at the following stages:
(i) The legislature considers a matter.
(ii) The legislature considers a message or rule (or both) related
to the matter.
(iii) The legislature considers an utterance with which to convey
the message or rule (or both).
(iv) The legislature legislates an utterance into text.
(v) The legislature publishes the text.
(vi) A third party receives the text.
(vii) A third party decodes the text to recover the utterance.
(viii) A third party reconstructs the message or rule (or both)
from the utterance.
(ix) A third party infers the matter addressed by the legislation
and the legislation’s relevant full meaning and effect.158
This approach again avoids use of any common purpose of the in-
dividual legislators.  Since they, too, may have divergent purposes to a
common end, any such approach is also at best problematic.159  How-
ever, the term “consider” has a procedural meaning which avoids such
problems.  To “consider” something, the legislature must also follow
the process recognized by law.160  Again, because of the lack of a sin-
gle speaker meaning here, I would also suggest that we seek a “best
reading” of a text so generated.
name is shorter and easier to market.  In such a case, one cannot find any common,
consistent purpose among the board members that could be imputed to the corporation.
157. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.20-8.24 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
158. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 5 (setting out a discourse model from which this is
adapted).
159. Legislators, too, can have different reasons for voting for legislation.  For exam-
ple, one may support legislation to widen a road because he believes the widening needs
to occur while another may doubt the need for the widening but may support the road as
a trade for another’s vote on another matter of perceived greater importance.
160. For example, those voting to impeach a president may have various motives.
However, they must follow the procedure set out in the Constitution: impeachment
must occur in the House and conviction must occur in the Senate by a two-thirds vote to
convict. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  These processes
are objective unlike the various motivations the individual legislators may have.
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B. REMEMBERING STAGE EIGHT: RECONSTRUCTION
As discussed in Section III above, in all such cases, stage (viii) is
critical and cannot be ignored.  We leave the job unfinished if we sim-
ply decode and stop with stage (vii).  We must also go on to reconstruct
the message.  As seen in Section III above, such reconstruction in dis-
course requires consideration of relevance, balance and politeness,
other background considerations, compass, and direct or indirect
encoding.
C. INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE LEGAL TEXTS
In understanding individual legal texts, we would assume a prin-
ciple of relevance as well as we would in discourse.161  In examining a
will, for example, we would assume that the document relates to the
testator’s estate and the testator’s wishes as to the disposition of the
testator’s estate.  The document should thus be read in such a light.
Similarly, unless we had evidence to the contrary, we would assume
politeness162 given the solemn nature of the document.  Such polite-
ness, for example, might explain why an heir is left out of a will by
omission rather than by a public airing of unpleasantness.
Additionally, in examining a contract drawn up by two individu-
als, we would assume that the document relates to the recordation
and implementation of the deal they struck and that it should be read
accordingly.  Furthermore, we would assume some degree of polite-
ness not only because of the solemnity of contracts but also because
offending a party upfront will not likely facilitate performance of the
contract.  Parties may therefore be circumspect in their language on
delicate matters and interpretation should take account of this where
there has been a clear meeting of the minds.
For example, a dog breeder might have suspicions that a pur-
chaser is lazy and might not properly exercise a dog being sold.  The
breeder does not note these suspicions in the contract or its recitals.
Instead, the breeder orally stresses the importance of exercise includ-
ing at least three walks a week, gets the buyer’s verbal acknowledge-
ment of the importance of all this, and adds provisions allowing the
breeder to inspect the buyer’s home from time to time and retrieve the
animal if the breeder “reasonably elects to do so.”  A year later, the
breeder learns that the dog has never been walked, and the breeder
demands return of the dog.  The reasonableness of this demand should
turn upon the mutually-acknowledged importance of thrice-weekly
walks, not upon the absence of any such requirement in the text.  Nor
161. See supra Section III(B).
162. See supra Section III(B).
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should we be confounded by dictionary definitions of “reasonable” or
by various “reasonable person” understandings.  No doubt reasonable
persons could disagree about the need for three walks per week.  Both
parties have clearly acknowledged the reasonableness of such walks,
and this sense of reasonableness should stand regardless of whether
the agreement contains a merger clause.163
The same points would also apply to corporate legal texts.  One
would assume specific corporate texts are relevant to the matter at
hand and that, for practical reasons at least, they are often polite to
the extent possible.  For example, a letter terminating a problem at-
will employee may simply say, “You are hereby terminated effective
immediately.  We appreciate your service and wish you well.”  Though
a good lawyer can of course improve this language, an employer in the
real world will sometimes use this language rather than setting out a
litany of wrong doings that might provoke retaliatory litigation.  If
such litigation comes, the textualist would be wrong to take “We ap-
preciate your services” as an affirmation of good work performance.  It
should be interpreted in light of the principle of politeness.
A very interesting area of pragmatic inquiry is whether there are
other common background principles besides relevance and politeness
in the context of individual and corporate legal texts.  For example, in
contracts is there a common background purpose of maximizing gain
or assuming enforceability?  If so, should contracts be read in ways
that maximize gain or enforceability?164  Except for Section IX below
on implementives, it is beyond the scope of this article to explore such
questions.  However, I hope to return to them at some future point.
D. PUBLIC LAW TEXTS
One has no less reason to believe that public law texts also follow
relevance and politeness principles.  To be enforceable, laws must at
the very least be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.165
This relevance standard is heightened as the issues involved become
more important: laws impacting certain constitutionally-protected
rights must be necessary for a compelling state interest.166  As we try
to assume relevance when interpreting discourse,167 why would we
163. See STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 67 (Oxford U.
Press 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(stating, “Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption
of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish . . . (c) the meaning of a writing,
whether or not integrated . . . .”).
164. See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2004).
165. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
166. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
167. See supra Section III(B).
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not do the same when interpreting legislation?  If one statutory inter-
pretation survives the applicable relevance scrutiny while another
does not, why would we not default toward the satisfactory reading?
Relevance and balance have no less importance in public than in pri-
vate law and pragmatics thus support such canons as “the avoidance
of unconstitutionality canon” (favoring “the interpretation of a statute
which avoids the risk of an unconstitutional statute”)168 and “the ab-
surdity canon” (avoiding “interpretations producing an absurd re-
sult”).169  Similarly, pragmatics also tells us that it is wrong to take a
literal reading that politeness would explain otherwise.  To take an
awful example from our past, the original Constitution and Bill of
Rights do not mention “slavery.”170  Even so, a textualist would be
wrong to deny that slavery was not Constitutionally protected before
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.
As with contracts, very interesting further pragmatic questions
exist here as well as to whether there are other common background
principles besides relevance and politeness in the context of public
law.  For example, as with contracts, is there also an assumption that
laws maximize economic benefits in certain ways171 or that they gen-
erally imply certain remedial rights?172  Except for my brief discus-
sion of implementives in Section IX below, it is also beyond the scope
of this article to explore such questions but I also hope to return to
them at some future point.
VI. INTERPRETING LEGAL TEXTS: CONTEXT AND ITS TYPES
“The meaning of words and other symbols commonly depends on
their context.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts173
“[I]t frequently happens that one person does not understand what
the other is saying, not because the words are not clear or the
phrasing ambiguous, but simply because the one interlocutor does
not see what the other is talking about, or because she or he inter-
168. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 14-15.
169. Id. at 3-9.
170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (referring
to “persons bound to Service for a Term of Years” in establishing the three-fifths
compromise).
171. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 16, at 144-49 (discussing law and economics).
172. See, e.g., id. at 113-21 (discussing implied causes of actions and remedies).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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prets that which the other is talking about as something entirely
different.”
–J. L. Mey174
“Textual interpretation can easily degenerate into a word game,
cut off from the background that helps us understand . . .
language.”
–William D. Popkin175
It is not difficult to understand why context must matter.  A word
in a vacuum is at best a marker of certain possible meanings that dic-
tionaries lay out.  As such, we need more information to determine
whether any of those dictionary meanings might apply in a given case.
For example, we need the context of Justice Scalia’s “applesauce” re-
mark noted above176 to determine its likely slang sense of “nonsense.”
Understanding the types and flux of context is thus critical to under-
standing meaning in use.
A. COGNITIVE CONTEXT
I use cognitive context to mean “the store of knowledge and
remembered experiences which forms a background against which ut-
terances are processed . . . , and which can affect how meanings are
construed.”177  For example, a teenager writes a district attorney that
a bully assaulted her at school.  Although lawyers can take “assault”
to mean a threat of physical harm, the district attorney should know
that the teenager may lack the necessary cognitive background for
this sense and should consider the likelihood of actual battery.178
B. PHYSICAL AND TEMPORAL CONTEXT
I use physical context to mean the shared physical background of
a given communication.  As Cruse puts it, physical context “refers to
things that the participants can see, hear, and so on, and each partici-
pant can assume is accessible to the other(s).”179  Similarly, I use
“temporal context” to mean the time background of a communication.
An easy example of the importance of physical context is, “Ap-
proaching bank.  Hold up there.”  Does “bank” mean a financial insti-
tution or does it mean a river bank?  If someone texts this to another
174. MEY, supra note 17, at 787.
175. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 45.
176. See supra note 3.
177. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 121.
178. See Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); Battery, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
179. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 8.
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fully-sentient person on the deck of a boat in the middle of a river, he
can reasonably assume the other person will know he is referring to
stopping at a river bank.  Thus, any “textualist” prosecutor prosecut-
ing the sender and recipient of this message for conspiracy to rob a
bank would fail to grasp the importance of physical context.
Temporal context can operate in ways that blend with physical
context and in ways that do not.  For example, if a group is sitting on a
beach in a location where one can usually see two kinds of “stars” (i.e.,
celebrities and astronomical objects), the statement, “I’m counting
stars” can also be clarified by time of day and year in which it is ut-
tered.  If it is noon at a time of year when it is daylight, star in the
astronomical sense can reasonably be considered unlikely.  However,
this could also be explained in terms of physical context: it is light and
no one can see the stars.  An example removed from physical context
would be the following: A person generally takes his nightcap (drink)
at 9 p.m. and puts on his nightcap (sleep hat) at midnight.  If he tells
his partner at 9 p.m. that he is having his nightcap, the partner can
reasonably assume that “nightcap” means drink.  The textualist who
misses the role of context here also risks missing the meaning of the
terms involved.
In the case of statutes, temporal context can also involve both leg-
islative history and the history of a statute—two quite different
things.  Legislative history is: “written materials generated by the leg-
islature in the process of writing a statute—most often committee re-
ports, and sometimes legislative debates.”180  Legislative history could
thus also be seen as part of the discourse and textual or internal con-
text discussed in Sections VI(D) and VI(E) below.  On the other hand,
“[t]he history of a statute refers to the historical environment from
which legislation arose, which can be demonstrated by conventional
legislative history or other sources of information.”181  Under the ordi-
nary definition of “history,” the term could also refer to the “chronolog-
ical record” of a statute.182  In the first sense at least, the history of a
statute could also be considered part of social, cultural, and human
context discussed next in Section VI(C).  Legislative history provides
invaluable context for statutes.  Imagine, for example, a statute which
simply provides: “Any person may hold up a failing bank.”  How can
we possibly understand this without looking at the legislative history?
180. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 165.  Because it is careful not to encompass “history
of a statute” as defined below, this definition is usefully narrower than other definitions
of “legislative history” such as “the background and events leading to the enactment of a
statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates.” Legislative History,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
181. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 110.
182. See History, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 664 (3d ed. 1993).
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History of legislation also provides invaluable context.  Since history
of legislation would include the way courts have interpreted that legis-
lation, again, how could we possibly understand the meaning of such
legislation without looking at its history?
C. SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND HUMAN CONTEXT
As Judge Easterbrook points out, “You don’t have to be Ludwig
Wittgenstein or Han-Georg Gadamer to know that successful commu-
nication depends on meanings shared by interpretive communi-
ties.”183  As Cruse also notes, speakers “will formulate an utterance
differently according to their assessment of such matters as the ad-
dressee’s age, intelligence, and relevant knowledge.”184  For example,
the question, “What is a birdie?” can mean something quite different
when addressed to an adult or a two-year-old child.  Since “birdie” is
informal and more childlike talk for a bird, without more, the adult’s
question likely involves golf or badminton or a possible host of other
“adult” things while the child’s likely involves birds.185
Human context also involves “the social and power relations” be-
tween the parties.186  A clear indicator of this would be forms of ad-
dress tied to status.187  For example, a lawyer indicates the power
difference between herself and a judge by referring to the judge as
“Your Honor.”  A dying if not dead more general English example of
status language is the distinction between “thou” and “you.”  As
Schmidt puts it, “thou” is the “personal pronoun of the second person
in the singular number; oftener used than at present, as being the
customary address from superiors to inferiors, and expressive, be-
sides, of any excitement of sensibility; of familiar tenderness as well as
of anger; of reverence as well as of contempt.”188
As modern English has generally replaced “thou” with “you,”189
modern readers can easily misinterpret or even be baffled by authors
who embraced the distinction.  For example, without understanding
“thou” as a function of status and social relationships, how could a
183. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916
F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990)).
184. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 8.
185. See Birdie, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 141 (3d ed. 1993).
186. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 121; see also infra Section XI(F)(5) discussing Social
Deixis.
187. See id. at 405-06 discussing the “tu-vous” distinction in French where among
other things “tu indicates intimacy” and “vous indicates lack of intimacy, or distance.”).
The French distinction generally parallels the thou-you distinction discussed in the
text. See id.
188. ALEXANDER SCHMIDT, SHAKESPEARE LEXICON AND QUOTATION DICTIONARY 1214
(Dover Publ’n., Inc. 3d 1971).
189. See id.
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modern reader meaningfully analyze the following: “Thou me, thou
my dog; if thou thouest me, I’ll thou [your] teeth down [your]
throat.”190  Understanding the status and relationship meanings of
the term also helps the reader see clever nuances the reader will oth-
erwise miss.  For example, in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night, Sir Toby
Belch tries to persuade Sir Andrew Aguecheek to use “thou” with Vi-
ola: “if thou thou’st him some thrice, it shall not be amiss.”191  In addi-
tion to the suggested insult to Viola, is Sir Toby also cleverly insulting
Sir Andrew as well by the use of “thou”?  One might also now ask why
the first quotation did not end with “thy teeth down thy throat” in-
stead of “your teeth down your throat.”192
D. DISCOURSE CONTEXT
In one sense, discourse context means the relevant preceding dis-
course.193  For example, “It is on the top shelf” can have widely differ-
ent meanings depending on what was said before.  The endless
possible meanings could involve a brief, a case reporter, a law diction-
ary, or even a cat depending upon whether the following questions
preceded it: “Where is the brief?”, “Where is the case book?”, “Where is
the Black’s Law Dictionary?”, or “Where is Tom?”
Though the example given above is a simple one, determining dis-
course context can be much more complex.  If the parties have been
speaking at length over the course of hours, days, or even years, where
does the discourse context begin and where does it end?  If the parties
refer to discourse of others, is that discourse incorporated by reference
into the discourse context?  Determining the extent of discourse con-
text can thus be no less complex than the determination of the extent
of a given text as discussed above in Section IV(B).  A detailed discus-
sion of determining the extent of discourse context is beyond the scope
of this article.  However, it is easy to see the importance of discourse
context in matters of law.  For example, in William Smith’s libel pro-
ceeding based on the published text “John Jones rightly orally con-
demned William Smith yesterday,” we must know what John Jones
said.  That is, we must know the discourse context.
In another sense, discourse context means the type or kind of dis-
course involved.194  As Cruse puts it, “A word may well be construed
differently according to whether it occurs in a poem, a medical consul-
tation, a casual conversation, or a police interrogation[,]” as well as
190. WILLIAM PENN, Preface to the Seventh Edition of GEORGE FOX, JOURNAL OF
GEORGE FOX 14 (Glasgow 1694).
191. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TWELFTH NIGHT act 3, sc. 2, line 45 (2015).
192. See PENN, supra note 190.
193. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 8.
194. Id. at 121.
2016] LAW’S “WAY OF WORDS” 259
“whether the [discourse] is formal or informal, and what the field of
discourse is (for instance, whether it is legal, political, medical, or
sporting, and so on).”195  This sort of discourse context is also of legal
importance.  For example, a manager overhears another employee
stating in a crowded workplace lunchroom: “Cassandra is a bitch.”
The manager is offended and reports what he has overheard.  Upon
investigation, human resources determines that the employee is a
Sheltie breeder who was answering another breeder’s question about
Cassandra’s, his dog, gender.  In this breeder discourse context, the
speaker thus presumably meant no offense.196
E. TEXTUAL OR INTERNAL CONTEXT
“A word changes meaning when it becomes part of a sentence, the
sentence when it becomes part of a paragraph.  A longer writing
similarly affects the paragraph, other related writings affect the
particular writing, and the circumstances affect the whole.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts197
“In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different con-
texts, sometimes mean different things.”
–Justice Ginsburg198
“We have several times affirmed that identical language may con-
vey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes
even in different provisions of the same statute.”
–Justice Ginsburg199
“Our duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated
provisions.”
–Chief Justice Roberts200
Textual or “[i]nternal context refers to the text surrounding the
[text which is] the most obvious focus of the interpreter’s atten-
tion.”201  Since, as discussed in Section IV(B) above, text is defined in
terms of its overall cohesion and purpose, it contradicts the very no-
195. Id.
196. See Bitch, THE NEW WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 82 (1980) (defining
bitch alternatively as “the female of the canine animals” and “a term of reproach for a
woman”).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
198. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015).
199. Id. (citing numerous examples).
200. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
201. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 135. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tion of text to interpret parts without reference to the whole.  As
Popkin puts it, “The entire text (that is, including internal context) is
the subject of interpretation, with the interpreter moving back and
forth among various elements of the text to decide what the text
means.”202
Turning again to our ACA example, Section 1401 of the ACA pro-
vides subsidies for coverage “enrolled in through an Exchange estab-
lished by the State under [Section] 1311[.]”203 Since no express
mention is made of federal Exchanges in the last provision, are subsi-
dies therefore available only for Exchanges set up by the states them-
selves?  Can we decide this question by looking only at Section 1401?
Given the cohesion necessary for text to exist in the first place, we
contradict ourselves in claiming we have a text and yet deny we can
look beyond Section 1401.  Again, Section 1311 of the ACA provides
that states “shall” set up “Exchanges” but Section 1321 recognizes
that a state may elect not to do so.  Additionally, Section 1321 pro-
vides that if a state does not elect to set up an Exchange, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services “shall . . . establish and operate
such Exchange within the State.”  Taken as a cohesive whole, why can
this “Exchange” not be an “Exchange” for purposes of Section 1401?
F. PURPOSE CONTEXT
“Determination that the parties have a principal purpose in com-
mon requires interpretation, but if such a purpose is disclosed fur-
ther interpretation is guided by it.  Even language which is
otherwise explicit may be read with a modification needed to make
it consistent with such a purpose.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts204
“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated
purposes.”
–Chief Justice Roberts205
“A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the
legislative plan.”
–Chief Justice Roberts206
202. Id.
203. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
205. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
206. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Purpose means the author’s “objective, goal, or end”207 or “general
rationale”208 for the text.  Since purpose helps one identify the very
text itself,209 it is not surprising that purpose (to the extent purpose
can be determined) helps one “resolve ambiguity,” resolve other “cases
of textual uncertainty,” and “figure out how to apply a statute to
changing circumstances.”210
Turning once more to our ACA example, Section 1401 of the ACA
provides subsidies for coverage “enrolled in through an Exchange es-
tablished by the State under [Section] 1311[.]”211  Purpose not only
helps us address whether subsidies are available only for Exchanges
set up by the states themselves.  We would in fact contradict ourselves
on whether we have a text to interpret if we deny we can consider such
purpose.  Again, Congress has passed the ACA hoping to make health-
care more affordable.212  Since this common purpose helps define the
text of the act, it makes no sense not to consider it—especially when a
reading that would deny subsidies to those in states with federal ex-
changes might defeat the very purpose the ACA.213  Cohesion con-
cerns would also point us to other provisions of the text.214
G. POLICY CONTEXT
“Considerations of justice and public policy play a significant part
in the ways courts should understand legal texts.”
–Kent Greenawalt215
As several basic argument types demonstrate, policy or value con-
siderations no doubt play a role in interpretation.  Among other
things: textual arguments can advance the value of objectivity of
words upon a page; intent-based arguments can advance the value of
respecting the will of the public or private law entity whose action is
207. Purpose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
208. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 188.
209. See supra Section IV(B)(2)(f).
210. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 189.
211. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
212. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2485 (stating, “The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the
individual health insurance market . . . [and] the act gives tax credits to certain people
to make insurance more affordable.”).
213. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2493-94) (stating, “Under [this] reading, however,
the Act would operate quite differently in a State with a Federal Exchange. As they see
it, one of the Act’s three major reforms—the tax credits—would not apply . . . .  It is
implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”).
214. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see
also Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2484 (stating, “[t]he structure of Section 36B itself suggests
that tax credits are not limited to State Exchanges.”).
215. GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 15.
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under investigation; precedent-based arguments can advance predict-
ability and stability of the law; tradition-based arguments can ad-
vance the value of social coherence; and policy-based arguments on
their face advance the role of policy in deciding how to interpret a
text.216
Thus, for example, given the importance of stare decisis, the Su-
preme Court has reaffirmed decisions that it may have doubted were
correctly decided.217  Additionally, for example, “ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”218
The rule of lenity is a policy-driven rule that ensures criminal statutes
provide “fair warning [of] conduct rendered illegal.”219  A detailed ex-
amination of how far and when policy and value contexts should be
considered is beyond the scope of this article.  However, as these ex-
amples show, value and policy contexts can and do impact determina-
tions of meaning.
H. CONTEXT FLUX
“[T]he context of words and other conduct is seldom exactly the
same for two different people, since connotations depend on the en-
tire past experience and the attitudes and expectations of the per-
son whose understanding is in question.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts220
In exploring the importance of context, the importance of context
flux cannot be overstated.  Failure to appreciate context flux easily
causes what I would call the fallacy of context equivocation, i.e., im-
properly treating one context as equivalent to another.  This could in-
clude, without limitation, improperly treating one temporal context as
equivalent to another temporal context (such improperly treating a
past context as equivalent to a present one) or improperly treating one
physical context as equivalent to another.  It could also involve im-
properly equating any of the other different types of context identified
in this Section VI.  For example, I find a diary with the following en-
try: “I have now visited every county in the State of North Carolina!”
If I tell you of my find and ask you how many counties would that be if
the statement is true, your first response should not be to look up the
216. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 15-16 (Carolina Acad.
Press 3d ed. 2015).
217. See id. at 42 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)).
218. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
219. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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number of counties in North Carolina and give me a number.  Your
first response should be: “When was the statement made?”  State and
county boundaries change over time and the number of counties in
North Carolina has greatly changed over time.221
We should not only guard against context equivocation among
ourselves.  We should also guard against imputing that fallacy to pre-
vious generations.  Unless we have good reason to believe otherwise,
we should not think that reasonable people of any era would equate
difference and would thus equate different community standards.  An
educated and intelligent founding father, for example, would have
known that notions of “cruel and unusual punishment” have evolved
over time as community standards have evolved.222  An educated and
intelligent founding father would therefore have reason to believe that
such standards could continue to evolve over time thereby generating
potentially different answers from those generated in 1791 when the
Bill of Rights was ratified.223  Do we not insult his intelligence by im-
puting to him a different understanding?224  Additionally, in deter-
mining whether the meaning of an intentionally vague term such as
“cruel and unusual punishment” can evolve over time, good interpret-
ers must also apply the principles of balance and relevance.  They
must also assume that drafters generally mean to be relevant and
thus do not generally mean to draft wrongly, irrationally, or incoher-
ently.  How could the phrase “cruel and unusual” be relevant if it does
not prohibit what is cruel and unusual at the time in question in addi-
tion to what might have been cruel and unusual in the past?
221. See, e.g., DAVID. L. CORBITT, FORMATION OF NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES 1663-
1943, at 283-294 (N.C. Div. of Archives and History 1996).
222. For example, at least by the late eighteenth century, persons would have no-
ticed that burning at the stake was no longer a “usual” mode of execution. See Hon.
William Renwick Riddell, Judicial Execution by Burning at the Stake in New York, 15
A.B.A. J. 373, 373-74 (1923) (burning at the stake was permissible under the Common
Law for acts of “petit treason,” although only for women. The practice was abolished in
England in 1790, and disappeared in the United States roughly concurrently).  The Bill
of Rights was “ratified by the requisite number of states” in 1791. MICHAEL KENT CUR-
TIS, J. WILSON PARKER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT xxvii (Carolina Acad.
Press 3d ed. 2011); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, J., plurality
opinion) (declaring “The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
223. See Stein, supra note 117, at 609.
224. Plane Meaning And Thought, supra note 31, at 677-79 (discussing how Queen
Anne’s possible different understanding of “awful” must be recognized and yet does not
rule out flexibility of future application of statutes involving such a word); see also Har-
old Anthony Lloyd, “Original” Means Old, “Original” Means New: An “Original” Look at
What “Originalists” Do, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 3 (2010) [hereinafter Original].
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VII. INTERPRETING LEGAL TEXTS: CODING AND COMPASS
IN MORE DETAIL
As discussed in Section III(D) above, the “compass” of a term
turns on the degree of precision or abbreviation of what is said or re-
ferred to.  I will examine how pragmatics can shed insight in several
areas of compass: encoding error, vagueness, ambiguity, anaphora,
cataphora, ellipsis, and, as discussed in the Appendix, deixis.
A. ENCODING ERROR
“—Who made those allegations? says Alf.
—I, says Joe.  I’m the alligator.”
–James Joyce, Ulysses225
“The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of
inartful drafting.  (To cite just one, the Act creates three separate
Section 1563s . . . .)”
–Chief Justice Roberts226
An encoding error occurs when “some specific element of the
meaning encoded in the linguistic form the speaker employs falls
outside any intention she has in producing [it].”227  Encoding errors
can include unintended vagueness (i.e., cases where it is difficult to
ascertain the meaning or application of a word or words228) and unin-
tended ambiguity (i.e., cases where it is difficult or impossible to tell
“which of a number of [ ] meanings is intended in that context”229).
However, for at least two reasons, I will not treat vagueness and ambi-
guity here as subsets of encoding error but will address them in their
own right below.  First, vagueness and ambiguity can also occur at the
message level before any encoding into an utterance or text.  For ex-
ample, the speaker may not have a clear notion that she is trying to
articulate.  Second, vagueness and ambiguity can be intentional.  For
example, a speaker may intentionally wish to be vague to leave her
options open.  I will thus, again, discuss vagueness and ambiguity in
their own right below.
Returning to encoding errors, consider the following example.
Mary mistakenly believes that “hoi polloi” means the upper class and
says “I’m of the hoi polloi” intending to communicate her upper-class
225. JOYCE, supra note 37, at 276.
226. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015).
227. CARSTON, supra note 1, at 18.
228. See Vague, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1489 (3d ed. 1993).
229. WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG & ROBERT FOGELIN, UNDERSTANDING ARGU-
MENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL LOGIC 333 (Wadsworth Cengage Learning 8th
ed. 2009).
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status.230  Literally she has failed to do this since “hoi polloi” means
“common folk” in ordinary language.231  She may thus successfully
communicate only if the audience similarly misunderstands the term,
or if the audience “recognizes the disparity between its meaning and
the speaker’s intention and, consistent with the principle of balance,
makes the appropriate adjustment.”232  If the remark is put in the
context of Mary’s perceived upper-class status, it is not a very difficult
balancing adjustment to make.233  (In addition to misunderstanding
common meanings of terms, common encoding errors also include
“malapropisms, so-called Freudian slips, and various articulatory er-
rors, such as spoonerisms, which are temporary malfunctions . . . [due
to] performance factors such as tiredness or emotional strain”234).
Since humans are imperfect, encoding errors occur, and it is hard
to see how strict refusal to recognize the real meaning of any encoding
error whatsoever could work in the real world.  Put another way, it is
hard to see how imperfect humans could operate without the principle
of balance discussed in Section III(B) above.  Thus, we have such no-
tions as clerical error (“[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or in
advertence”235) and scrivener’s error (“a mistake in drafting the text
of a statute”236).  For example, most would likely consider the follow-
ing an easy case of such error needing correction: “imprisonment for
not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years and both.”237  This
seems easy because “the text itself makes no sense.”238  The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts thus also sensibly recognizes the need to
correct encoding errors: “To fit the immediate verbal context or the
more remote total context particular words or punctuation may be dis-
regarded or supplied; [and] clerical or grammatical errors may be
corrected[.]”239
230. See CARSTON, supra note 1, at 18.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Again, if we assume a speaker means to be relevant, we by definition assume
she does not generally mean to speak wrongly, irrationally, or incoherently even if her
language can be interpreted as wrong, incomplete, irrational, or incoherent. See supra
Section III.  This, therefore, means that we should generally prefer a rational, and co-
herent meaning where possible unless we have strong reasons to believe otherwise.
234. CARSTON, supra note 1, at 19.
235. Clerical Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
236. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 234.  “Scrivener’s error” can also apply to private law
documents. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Sovereign Bank, 44 F. Supp. 3d 394, 407
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Trust 2005-2, 2014 WL 3858506, at
*23 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014)) (stating, “Under New York law, the doctrine of scrivener’s
error allows contracts to be reformed when there is a mistake in the writing that memo-
rialized the contract.”).
237. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 235 (emphasis in original).
238. Id.
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt (d) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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Similarly, it is hard to see how the principle of balance would not
require reading “enrolled in through an Exchange established by the
State under Section 1311”240 to include federally established ex-
changes.  Because that principle requires us to generally prefer a ra-
tional, and coherent meaning where possible unless we have strong
reasons to believe otherwise, how can we reasonably refuse that read-
ing in favor of a reading that would threaten not only the health cover-
age of millions but threaten the very ACA itself?241  Such a
destructive reading would not rationally cohere with the purpose of
the ACA to expand coverage and decrease its costs.242  Thus, the prin-
ciple of balance weighs in favor of correcting encoding errors and
adopting a reading that does not conflict with the statute’s purpose.
B. VAGUENESS
1. Vague as Ill Defined
“When do we have a heap?  When does a man become bald?”243
Imagine that a contract calls for the delivery of one thousand
“green bananas” at 5 p.m. EST on January 2, 2016.  Since both the
words “green” and “banana” have clear dictionary definitions,244 the
textualist might well find nothing vague about this phrase.  After all,
a word is “vague” only if it is “[n]ot clear in meaning or in
application.”245
Considering language in use, pragmatics helps us see how this
phrase is vague.  When we try to use it in practice, we are faced with
translating it into what the parties likely meant.  Assuming for the
sake of argument that we have settled on the type of banana and the
acceptable shades of green, must each banana be green “only on its
skin,” “all over its skin,” “mostly [‘or a bit’] on a particular patch of
skin” or all through the banana?246
240. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
241. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2493 (stating, “In 2014, approximately 87 percent of
people who bought insurance on a Federal Exchange did so with tax credits, and virtu-
ally all of those people would become exempt [under this reading] . . . .  The combination
of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement could well push a State’s indi-
vidual insurance market into a death spiral.”).
242. See id. at 2496 (stating, “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve
health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the
Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.”).
243. See GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 38.
244. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 596, 106 (3d ed. 1993) (de-
fining “green” and “banana.”).
245. Vague, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1489 (3d ed. 1993).
246. See Emma Borg, Pragmatic Determinants of What is Said, in CONCISE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS 753, 755 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
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Pragmatics thus recognizes that boundaries of concepts can be
“fuzzy and contextually flexible.”247  Good lawyers recognize this as
well.  Though “green” and “banana” have standard dictionary defini-
tions, this will not suffice without more for a well-drafted commercial
contract involving the purchase of bananas.  Given the questions
raised above, the well-drafted contract will include more detailed spec-
ifications about the products purchased.  This would include details
beyond just the greenness question raised.  What kind of bananas?
What size of bananas?  (One-inch bananas would presumably be unac-
ceptable.)  How freshly picked?  And so on.
Pragmatics also recognizes that vague terms do not necessarily
mean that the underlying message is vague.  As we have seen in the
Sections above, terms are evidence but not the only evidence of the
underlying message conveyed in the nine-stage process discussed in
Section III.  As we have seen in the Sections above, the principles of
relevance and balance require us to consider such other evidence as
purpose and other context in determining message meaning.  Such
other evidence can of course remove potential vagueness in the under-
lying message.
That said, pragmatics also recognizes that both terms and the un-
derlying message can be and sometimes should be vague.  If, for exam-
ple, parties are unsure how long it will take to perform a contract for
the sale of good, they might decide to provide for a “reasonable” per-
formance time rather than specify the actual number of days.248  In
such a case both the term and underlying message would have loose
boundaries.
2. Vague as Lax
“[T]here is no exactly straight line in nature, no real circle, no ab-
solute measure.”
–Nietzsche249
In addition to this looseness-of-definition component of vague-
ness, pragmatics recognizes a “laxness” sense of vagueness that is use-
ful to lawyers.250  This involves cases where terms are “easily defined,
but they are habitually applied in a loose way.”251  For example, the
definition of “circle” is geometrically precise but often not expected in
247. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 55.
248. See U.C.C. § 2-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
249. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS
(1878) reprinted in The Nietzsche Reader 165 (Keith Ansell Pearson & Duncan Large,
eds. 2006).
250. See CRUSE, supra note 27, at 200.
251. Id.
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practice as when, for example, we say the audience formed a circle
around a speaker.252
This laxness component of vagueness can come as a rude shock to
the practicing lawyer.  A classic example involves performance timing.
If we say that the above bananas are due at 5:00 p.m. EST on January
2, 2016, have we not been clear that the seller is in material breach if
the bananas do not arrive until the next day?  Well, our terms may
have been clear as to the expected timing but courts may give the
seller some “reasonable” leeway in delivery time where we have not
also expressly stated that “time is of the essence.”253  (I say our terms
“may have been clear” but were they at least on their face?  For exam-
ple, does “at 5:00 p.m. EST” mean precisely at that moment, any time
up to and including that moment, or some “reasonable” time up to and
including that moment?).  Thus, laxness can make facially-straightfor-
ward terms vague and thereby require the interpreter to move beyond
the words themselves to determine meaning.
C. AMBIGUITY
“He is in the grip of a vice.”
–Paul Grice254
“The defendant was arrested for fornicating under a little used [ ]
statute.”
–Richard C. Wydick255
“But oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or
phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”
–Chief Justice Roberts256
“Rather, the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is deter-
mined not only by reference to the language itself, but as well by
252. See id.
253. See U.C.C. § 2-309 (stating, “The time for shipment or delivery or any other
action under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasona-
ble time.”).  It is also worth noting that the presence of “time is of the essence” in a
contract will not necessarily lead to enforcement of a strict time frame. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (cautioning that “stock
phrases such as ‘time is of the essence’” are not dispositive, but rather “are to be consid-
ered along with other circumstances in determining the effect of delay.”).
254. GRICE, supra note 4, at 25.
255. RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 47 (5th ed. 2005).  This book
is a little masterpiece for the lawyer who would learn to write well.
256. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.”
–Justice Ginsburg257
Again, a word or phrase is ambiguous if it is difficult or impossible
to tell “which of a number of possible meanings is intended in that
context.”258  Without the element of “impossible or difficult to tell” in a
given context, “virtually every expression is ambiguous, because virtu-
ally every expression admits of more than one interpretation.”259  I
thus include this additional element in the definition to limit the scope
of the ambiguous.  Furthermore, ambiguity can be semantic, syntac-
tic, and pragmatic.260  As with vagueness, pragmatics recognizes that
ambiguous terms do not necessarily mean that the underlying mes-
sage is ambiguous.  Again, as we have seen in the Sections above,
terms are evidence but not the only evidence of the underlying mes-
sage conveyed in the nine-stage process discussed in Section III.
Again, as we have seen in the Sections above, the principles of rele-
vance and balance require us to consider such other evidence as pur-
pose and other context in determining message meaning.  Such other
evidence can well render the underlying message unambiguous.
Before moving to the types of ambiguity, the fact that “virtually
every expression admits of more than interpretation” surely does not
bode well for textualism.261  How could “the” meaning of a word be
plain on its face if “virtually every expression admits of more than one
interpretation[?]”262 But of course to ask this is to ask how it could
ever make sense to hold that one must “rely on the text to the exclu-
sion of other interpretive criteria, if the meaning is ‘plain’[?]”263  Since
virtually every word has multiple meanings, how could it make practi-
cal sense to hold that the text itself provides sufficient context for a
“plain” reading?  The difficulty of attempting this would increase dra-
matically for every additional word of text since more multiple possi-
ble meanings would be added with each word and expression added.
This overarching problem for textualism applies to each of the specific
forms of ambiguity defined below.
257. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (2015) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
258. SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 229, at 333.
259. Id. at 334.
260. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 11; CRUSE, supra note 27, at 100.
261. SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG ET. AL., supra note 229, at 333.
262. Id.
263. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 263.
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1. Semantic Ambiguity
“ ‘[Z]ebra’ may refer to a mammal, a butterfly, a lizard, a fish, a
type of plant, tree or wood, or merely to the letter ‘Z’ . . . .”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts264
Semantic ambiguity exists where a word or expression can rea-
sonably have different meanings in a given context or contexts.265  For
example, is “a ‘monarch’ . . . a ruler or a butterfly,” and is “a ‘ruler’ . . .
a monarch” or a measuring instrument?266  Is “Consideration” recited
in a particular contract, “Careful thought,” or is it, “Something prom-
ised, given, or done that has the effect of making an agreement a le-
gally enforceable contract[?]”267  We of course cannot answer any of
these questions sensibly apart from their contexts.  Similarly, would it
not be reasonable to ask whether in its overall context the phrase “en-
rolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [Sec-
tion] 1311”268 is capable of multiple meanings including one capturing
federally-established Exchanges?
2. Syntactic Ambiguity
“When workers are injured frequently no compensation is paid.”
–Richard C. Wydick269
Syntactic ambiguity occurs “when there is uncertain meaning re-
sulting from unclear grammatical references.”270  For example, does
“Green apples, pears, and jello” mean that all three must be green or
is it equivalent to, “Pears, jello, and green apples”?  Or is, “He often
goes to town, often goes to the pool, and often goes to the beach on
Tuesday” equivalent to, “He often goes to town, often goes to the pool,
and often goes to the beach, on Tuesday”?  If so, does Tuesday only
apply to the beach or to town and pool as well?
The answer to the Tuesday question can depend on whether one
follows the rule of the last antecedent.  Under that rule, “qualifying
words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding
them and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is
necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.”271
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
265. See POPKIN, supra note 16, at 238.
266. Id. at 238.
267. Consideration, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 297 (3d ed. 1993).
My bet would be that most students on their first day of law school would pick the
former and not the latter definition.
268. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
269. WYDICK, supra note 255, at 48.
270. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 258.
271. Rule of the Last Antecedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
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Thus, “[i]f the text says: ‘A, B, and C, [modifying phrase],’ the phrase
probably modifies A, B, and C; but if the text says ‘A, B, and C [modi-
fying phrase’ [sic]], the omission of the comma after the reference to C
indicates the phrase modifies only C.”272
Wydick further gives a number of good examples of syntactic am-
biguity.  Some of my favorites include: “My client has discussed your
proposal to fill the drainage ditch with his partners”; “Being beyond
any doubt insane, Judge Weldon ordered the petitioner’s transfer to a
state mental hospital”; and “A trustee who steals dividends often can-
not be punished.”273
The good lawyer is also aware that the beast of syntactic ambigu-
ity exists and takes steps to avoid it.  He understands the rule of the
last antecedent may be applied to his work, and he takes care, among
other things, to: (1) “avoid wide gaps” between his subjects, verbs, and
objects; (2) put “conditions and exceptions where they are clear and
easy to read”; (3) put “modifying words close to what they modify”; (4)
clarify “the reach of modifiers”; and (5) of course punctuate care-
fully.274  He also uses the Oxford Comma where appropriate.275  He
does not write, “I dedicate this treatise to my parents, Jane Austen
and God.”  He writes, “I dedicate this treatise to my parents, Jane
Austen, and God.”276
D. INDETERMINACY
Vagueness and ambiguity should not be confused with indetermi-
nacy, which can exist on epistemic and metaphysical levels.277  Epi-
stemic indeterminacy exists where we lack sufficient knowledge to
reasonably determine the matter.278  An obvious case of epistemic in-
determinacy would be an encrypted message which we are unable to
break.  The indeterminacy exists because we lack the knowledge to
break the code.  Of course, indeterminacy here would disappear were
we ever to discover the key to the encryption.  Metaphysical indeter-
minacy exists where a proposition “is neither correct nor incorrect.”279
272. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 258.
273. WYDICK, supra note 255, at 47.
274. Id. at 41-53, 81-107.
275. See WILLIAM STRUNK & E. B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 2 (4th ed. 1999).
276. As my research assistant Steven Verez points out, the Oxford Comma is not a
cure all.  As he notes, tweaking my example in the text to “I dedicate this treatise to my
mother, Jane Austen, and God” might create the appearance of an appositive phrase
where Jane Austen is my mother.
277. See GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 42-45 (discussing epistemic and metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy).
278. See id. at 42 (stating “Epistemic indeterminacy may exist if highly reasonable
people, as well informed as is practical, have an unresolvable disagreement about
whether [something] is correct, or have no idea whether it is correct”).
279. Id.
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Thus, Greenawalt would consider “[a] claim that chocolate ice cream is
best is indeterminate in the metaphysical sense” because “there is no
correct answer to which flavor of ice cream is best.”280
Both senses of indeterminacy raise important points.  First, as
with vagueness and ambiguity, epistemic indeterminacy of terms does
not mean that the message is also epistemically indeterminate.  Once
again, as we have seen in Sections above, the principles of relevance
and balance require us to consider such other evidence as purpose and
other context in determining message meaning.  Such other evidence
can well render the underlying message knowable.  This fact should
make the textualist approach metaphysical indeterminacy with care.
Holding fast to a general belief that there can be no correct answer
apart from text is, as these Sections have shown us, simply not true.
E. ANAPHORA AND CATAPHORA
Anaphora points backwards to some antecedent281 as does the
pronoun in, “Jane saw John and he saw Jane.”  Cataphora, on the
other hand, refers forward as with the pronoun in, “It was wonderful,
that wedding[.]”282  Both anaphora and cataphora “produce textual
continuity or cohesion through a network of internal references.”283
For simplicity’s sake, I shall concentrate on anaphora in the re-
mainder of this Section.  Commonly recognized anaphors include pro-
nouns, “reduced proper names,” noun phrases, and “ellipses of various
kinds.”284  However, the antecedent need not be a word.  It can also be
some preceding “percept or [ ] nonverbal signal[.]”285  For example, a
deponent might make a grimace or snide remark and opposing counsel
might instruct her associate “to make a note of it.”  Anaphora can also
include “lazy” use of definite articles as in, “He’s been to Italy many
times but he still doesn’t speak the language.”286  Here the context lets
us understand that “the” can mean the pronoun “its” so that the sen-
tence can read “its language” or “Italian.”
Although they may not know the term “anaphora,” good lawyers
know the importance of its function in drafting.  For example, they
know the importance of defined terms that can be used to precisely
and economically refer back to even the most complex defined notions.
280. Id.
281. See F. Cornish, Discourse Anaphora, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS
184, 185 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
282. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 33.
283. Id.
284. See Cornish, supra note 281, at 187.
285. See id. at 185.
286. See JACOB L. MEY, PRAGMATICS: AN INTRODUCTION 58 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter
PRAGMATICS].
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They also know the importance of being clear in their pronoun usage
so that one is not left to debate, for example, whether Jane or Mary is
the referent of “she.”
What I fear many good lawyers do not know, however, is the
anaphoric role that other language can play.  I do not mean missing
the anaphoric role in simple cases such as “John Smith just arrived
from London—our man from England is here at last.”  Instead, I mean
the anaphoric role that phrase plays or might play in more complex
situations such as the ACA example mentioned earlier.
Again, Section 1311 of the ACA provides that states “shall” set up
“Exchanges” while Section 1321 recognizes that a state may elect not
to do so.287  Additionally, Section 1321 provides that if a state does not
elect to set up an Exchange, the Department of Health and Human
Services “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the
State[.]”288  Finally, Section 1401 of the ACA provides subsidies for
coverage “enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State
under [Section] 1311 . . . .”289  Since no express mention is made of
federal Exchanges in the last provision, are subsidies therefore availa-
ble only for Exchanges set up by the states themselves?290
In attempting to answer this question, should we not consider
whether either some part or the whole of the phrase “enrolled in
through an Exchange established by the State under [Section]
1311”291 is an anaphoric abbreviation which means to pick up both
state and federal exchanges which were referred to previously?  Once
we understand the concept of anaphora, it is hard to see how a thor-
ough examination of the language avoids consideration of whether we
have anaphora.  If we do have anaphora, that can erase any doubt
that might have otherwise existed.
Regardless of how we might answer the anaphora question in the
case of the ACA, the above example illustrates a problem that must
vex the textualist.  If we try to focus on any plain meaning of a term or
a phrase in a dictionary sense (again assuming “plain meaning”
makes sense), we can go astray when we have anaphora.  For exam-
ple, if the phrase “the genius” is used as anaphor to refer back to the
person in “John Smith just lost two weeks’ worth of data,” the diction-
287. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311, 1321, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031,
18041 (2010).
288. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2010).
289. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
290. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (stating “This case is about
whether the Act’s interlocking reforms apply equally in each State no matter who estab-
lishes the State’s Exchange. Specifically, the question presented is whether the Act’s tax
credits are available in States that have a Federal Exchange.”).
291. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
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ary is at best going to be of limited use in determining what “the ge-
nius” means in this context.
F. ELLIPSIS
Ellipsis as I use the term here is the omission of “some essential
structural element” that “can only be recovered by referring to an ele-
ment in the preceding text.”292  In such a case, the elliptical text can-
not be properly understood without referring to that missing
element.293  For example, a lawyer is debating which of two neckties
he should wear in court for an important hearing that day.  The law-
yer emails his associate: “I’m debating whether to wear my yellow,
blue, or red tie to the Smith hearing today.  I think I prefer the red tie.
Which do you think would be best?”  His associate emails back: “Blue
is best.”  The associate’s elliptical statement cannot be properly under-
stood without the applicable discourse context, without referring to
the preceding discourse about the hearing and which tie might be
preferable.  That said, the reply email can be easily understood in the
discourse context to apply to ties.  “Blue is best” should not thus be
taken to mean “blue is the best color,” even though one might argue it
has such a “plain meaning” out of context.
Similarly, one would be wrong to ignore possible ellipsis when in-
terpreting other texts.  Taking our ACA example again, a careful in-
terpreter would ask whether Section 1401 might involve ellipsis.
Again, Section 1401 of the ACA provides subsidies for coverage “en-
rolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [Sec-
tion] 1311 . . . .”294  In light of other Sections allowing the federal
government to set up exchanges for a state,295 why could Section 1401
not be read as elliptical, as including state exchanges set up through
the action of the federal government?  Of course, however we might
answer any ellipsis question in the case of the ACA, the above exam-
ple also illustrates a vexing problem for the textualist.  Ellipsis can
exist even where meaning appears to be plain (as in “blue is best”).
VIII. FURTHER MEANING BEYOND THE MESSAGE: GAPS
AND OMISSIONS
“Could mortal Lip divine
The undeveloped Freight
Of a delivered Syllable –
292. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 56.
293. See Id.
294. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
295. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2010).
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‘Twould crumble with the weight –”
–Emily Dickinson296
As we saw in Section III above, stage (ix) of Cruse’s modified out-
line involves inferring the purpose and relevant meaning and effect of
a communication.  This relevant meaning and effect may go well be-
yond what the speaker had in mind when making a statement.  First,
meaning may expand through entailment as that term is explored in
more detail in the Appendix.  Second, if gaps in meaning exist, mean-
ing may expand beyond the author’s intended message because of de-
fault rules for filling gaps.  Third, meaning may expand as texts are
applied to the world.  For example, we do not know whether a prohibi-
tion of motor vehicles in the park prohibits motor-powered wheel
chairs until we have a ruling on the matter.  Once we have that ruling,
the meaning of “motor vehicle” has changed to the extent it either now
expressly includes or excludes motor-powered wheel chairs.  Fourth,
textual meaning can expand simply through our general increase in
knowledge over time.  Borges, for example, makes this point with his
wonderful short story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.”297  Be-
cause of our greater knowledge today, any rewriting of that novel
must produce a richer and more meaningful novel.298  Though all
these types of meaning expansion create problems for the textualist
who claims meaning is confined to the text, for sake of brevity I will
focus a bit further on gaps and omissions, and, in the Appendix, en-
tailments.  I use “gap” to mean an unaddressed matter in a context
where a reasonable person would ordinarily have addressed the mat-
ter.  I use the term “omission” to refer any matter not addressed other
than a gap.  Any text will have an infinite number of omissions (since,
except for any gaps, everything not included is an omission) but it may
or may not have gaps.  For example, “I hereby unconditionally accept
your attached offer” has no (at least obvious) gaps.
296. EMILY DICKINSON, THE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 1877 (R. W. Franklin ed.,
Harvard U. Press 2000) (Poem No. 1456).
297. Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in COLLECTED FIC-
TIONS 88-100 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1989); see also Daniel C. Dennett, Introduction to
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND X (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (like in Borges’s tale,
“The Concept of Mind is a much richer text than it was when Ryle wrote it in mid-
century.”).
298. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
276 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
A. ILLUSORY GAPS
“[T]he primary search is for a common meaning of the parties, not
a meaning imposed on them by the law.”
–Restatement (Second) of Contracts299
Though gaps and omissions may necessarily seem to leave holes
in the meaning of a message, our use of language proves more flexible
than that.  For example, there would be no performance ambiguity in
“X must deliver 10 widgets to Y at a price of one dollar per widget,
payment due upon delivery” if the parties have previously orally
agreed upon acceptable timing, quality, and place of delivery.  As dis-
cussed in the Sections above, this would simply involve putting the
phrase in its discourse context and recognizing the ellipsis involved.
Consistent with this, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts pro-
vides that a contract is to be “interpreted in accordance with” any
“same meaning” that the parties have attached to an agreement.300
Additionally, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also provides that
prior agreements and negotiations may be considered to determine
“the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated[.]”301  The Uni-
form Commercial Code also recognizes the importance of discourse
context in its definition of “agreement”:  “the bargain of the parties in
fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances,
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade[.]”302  The Uniform Commercial Code also provides that an
agreement may be “explained or supplemented” “by evidence of consis-
tent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.”303  Again, given the discourse context here, a court
should find no such intention of merger and should recognize the ellip-
sis involved.  This sort of “gap” would thus not expand meaning be-
yond what the parties intended.
B. REAL GAPS
Though it may at first seem counterintuitive that real gaps or
holes can actually add meaning, they absolutely can.  In adding such
meaning, such real gaps can be intentional or accidental.  For exam-
ple, contracting parties may decide that it will take them too long to
negotiate the timing of delivery for a shipment of nails and are there-
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201.
301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c).
302. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
303. U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
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fore content to have a judge determine the matter should they have a
dispute.  Other parties may simply overlook or forget to address the
matter of such timing.304  Where the parties have simply failed to ad-
dress timing (unlike the widget example above where the parties had
agreed upon timing though they omitted it in their writing), the Uni-
form Commercial Code will plug the hole with requiring delivery in a
reasonable time.305  Here the imputed meaning of the text would thus
as a matter of law stretch beyond its original meaning to the extent a
court assigns specific terms the parties may not have expected.
C. ADDRESSING POSSIBLE GAPS AND OMISSIONS
If one thus understands a “gap” to be an unaddressed matter in a
context where a reasonable person would ordinarily have addressed
the matter, apparent gaps on their face require careful review.  Since
by definition reasonable people would not have ordinarily left the mat-
ter unaddressed, the interpreter has good cause to pause when she
finds an apparent gap.  Additionally, the principles of relevance and
balance would require a gapless interpretation if that can be reasona-
bly done.  If reasonable parties generally seek to address all relevant
matters correctly, rationally, and coherently, then we should approach
possible gaps with suspicion unless we have good reason otherwise.
The widget contract above is an example of how potential gaps can
reasonably be disposed of as illusory.  Of course, where it appears
from the applicable evidence that parties have intentionally left gaps
(such as in the nail shipment example above), the gap should be recog-
nized and any default rules should be allowed to fill the gap.
The principles of relevance and balance also apply to possible
gaps in public law texts.  Thus, for example, the question of whether
subsidies are available under the ACA in states with federal ex-
changes should not end with merely looking at the language of Section
1401 of the ACA which might appear to contain a gap regarding subsi-
dies for coverage in federal exchanges.306  The principles of relevance
and balance should make us consider whether Section 1401 can be
read in light of the purpose and other Sections of the ACA in a way
that leaves no gap.  As we have seen in the Sections above, under-
standing the context in which the statute was drafted would in fact
find any such gap counterintuitive.  The principles of relevance and
304. Unintentional gaps can come in other ways. A court, for example, may strike a
severable provision of a contract thereby leaving that subject matter unaddressed. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 183 cmt. a.
305. See U.C.C. § 2-309; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d
(stating “if no time is specified, a term calling for performance within a reasonable time
is supplied.”).
306. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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balance thus prevent the gap question from being simply a “word
game”307 restricted to Section 1401.
IX. IMPLEMENTIVES
“Qui vult finem vult media.”308
A further category of additional meaning in use includes what I
have begun to call (for want of a better term) “implementives.”  As far
as I know, the use of the term is my own; I know of no others who have
brought together, under one such pragmatic concept, both the “micro”
and “macro” notions discussed below.  Although the subject merits
much more space than I can give it here, I wish to address it briefly in
the hope that others might expand upon the notion especially at the
“macro” level discussed below.
Because we have limited power and knowledge, our pragmatics
must recognize the real-world distinction between, for example, form-
ing a contract and implementing a contract, or between legislating a
rule and implementing that rule.  Though an omniscient and omnipo-
tent being might create light by simply saying, “Let there be light,” we
could never accomplish such a thing by mere language.  We would also
have to figure out how to implement the proclamation.309  In such a
case, it would go without saying that “to will the end, is to will the
proper means,”310 and implementives flow from that principle (which
I shall call the “implementive principle.”)  As discussed below, imple-
mentives can exist at both the “micro” and “macro” levels.
A. “MICRO-IMPLEMENTIVES”
I use “micro-implementives” to cover, among other things, imple-
mentation of the subject matter of discourse, agreements, and rules.
Because of our human limitations just noted, this area has received
considerable attention though its pragmatic nature may have been
often missed.  For example, the law of remedies in general and “im-
plied” causes of action can be justified in terms of an implementive
principle (i.e., that to grant the right is to grant some way to imple-
ment that right) even where the applicable contract or statute may not
307. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
308. JAMES T. BRETZKE, CONSECRATED PHRASES: A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY:
LATIN EXPRESSIONS COMMONLY FOUND IN THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 199 (3d ed. 2013).  I
would translate this as “One who wishes the end wishes the means.”
309. This is not to say that we can never accomplish things merely by words.  A
person with the proper authority can of course close a meeting by saying, “I declare this
meeting closed.” AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 156; see also id. at 148-64 (providing a gen-
eral overview of such “performative” use of language).
310. This is a morally improved version of the maxim cited above. See supra note
308 and accompanying text.
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address implementation.311  Because of the considerable development
of the law of remedies, for example,312 I shall not address micro-imple-
mentives beyond (A) noting the underlying role of pragmatics and the
implementive principle and (B) noting that remedial gaps like others
can be subject to pragmatic closure.313  However, I would ask in pass-
ing why it would not be reasonable to consider whether the phrase,
“enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [Sec-
tion] 1311”314 implementively implies inclusion of federally-estab-
lished Exchanges when failure to do so would likely render the ACA
incapable of achieving its goals.315
B. “MACRO-IMPLEMENTIVES”
I use “macro-implementives” to cover implementation of discourse
or rules apart from their subject matter.  Unlike micro-implementives,
this area seems lacking both in terms of what has been said and done
and in terms of what has not been said and done.
This is not to say that macro-implementives have been fully ig-
nored in substance at least (although not of course by this term).
Though Lon Fuller unfortunately uses phrases such as “[t]he inner
morality of the law,”316 he has famously recognized what I would con-
sider macro-implementives.  Fuller recognizes that a legal system’s
rules “normally serve the primary purpose of setting the citizen’s rela-
tions with other citizens[.]”317  In serving that end, Fuller notes that
rules (whatever specific subject matter they may address) cannot work
if they are (1) ad hoc, (2) not publicized, (3) retroactively applied in
abusive fashion, (4) not understandable, (5) contradictory, (6) other-
wise beyond a party’s power to perform, (7) changed with disorienting
frequency, or (8) administered in a way that differs from their
announcement.318
I shall briefly review each point in turn.  (1) The first point is ar-
guably definitional since what is ad hoc is arguably not a rule.  How-
ever, to the extent rules can be ad hoc, we of course cannot obey them
311. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 16, at 113-121 (discussing implied causes of action
and remedies in the statutory context).
312. See id.
313. See supra Section VIII (discussing pragmatics and gaps).
314. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
315. See supra notes 207, 236, 237, 239 and accompanying text; see also King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (stating, “The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the
individual health insurance market . . . [and] the act gives tax credits to certain people
to make insurance more affordable.”).
316. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (Yale U. Press rev. ed. 1979).
317. Id. at 207-08.
318. See id. at 39.
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before they are made, and it is hard to set relations with others if the
rules change depending upon the situation.  The remaining seven of
these eight points are pure pragmatics.  They all expressly turn on
ways that rules can fail given our human limitations.  (2) We are not
omniscient and cannot recognize and obey a rule which we cannot
know.  Thus pragmatics demands publication.  (3) At the time we act,
we cannot recognize and obey a rule that does not yet exist.  Again,
perhaps we could if we were omniscient but we are not, and pragmat-
ics thus demands a limit on retroactive rule making.  (4) We cannot
obey rules we do not understand.  Given again our lack of omniscience,
pragmatics demands that rules be understandable.  (5 & 6) We cannot
perform rules beyond our ability to perform.  Pragmatics thus de-
mands that rules not be contradictory or otherwise beyond our ability
to perform.  (The contradictory is also of course incomprehensible and
also violates the demand of understandability.)  (7) By definition, we
cannot follow rules changed with disorienting frequency.  Pragmatics
thus demands such disorienting changes not be done.  (8) Since we
rely on the way rules are promulgated, pragmatics demands that rules
not be administered in a way that differs from their announcement.
Instead of an “internal morality” (whatever that could mean),
what we see here are macro-level pragmatic requirements for worka-
ble rules in real-world human day-to-day life.  These eight macro-im-
plementives provide inherent restraints that no operative rules can
generally ignore.  If the macro-implementives are so ignored, the rules
cannot operate in the real world of human day-to-day life.  These eight
macro-implementives thus effectively provide protections (such as
prohibitions against ex post facto laws) that would remain under our
common notions of rules even if express laws to such effect were re-
pealed.319  In other words, since to will an operative rule is to will its
macro-implementives, to legislate an operative rule is to legislate its
macro-implementives.
Additionally, these macro-implementives provide interpretive
guidance.  If we assume relevance when we interpret, it is difficult to
find, for example, relevance if we interpret a rule in a way that vio-
lates macro-implementives.  For how could a “rule” be relevant to
human conduct (except perhaps in some sadistic or tortuous way) if
that “rule” is not capable of being followed?  Thus, if one interpreta-
tion would violate one or more of Fuller’s rules while another would
not, then relevance demands the interpretation that would not violate
such rules.
319. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, Let’s Skill all the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons
in Law and Rhetoric, 6 ACTA IURIDICA OLOMUCENSIA 9, 35-43 (2011) [hereinafter Let’s
Skill all the Lawyers] (discussing what I called a “Semiotic Decalogue.”).
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Finally, I would like to see how far we might extend Fuller’s list
taken as macro-implementives.  For example, I believe macro-imple-
mentives prohibit at least some restrictions on speech if we are to
have operative rules.  First, there must be sufficient allowance of
speech320 to convey and implement the rules.  Second, speech must be
allowed to the extent necessary or expedient to enforce the rules.
Third, enforcement of rules involves such empirical questions as how
to follow the rules, whether the rules are being followed, and, if so, to
what end and effect.  We must thus permit sufficient speech to hon-
estly explore these questions, or we have violated the implementive
principle and have thus not truly implemented the rules.  Put another
way, since legislating rules also legislates the necessary macro-imple-
mentives, legislating rules legislates at least the necessary allowance
of speech to implement the rules.  Furthermore, as I have noted else-
where, the vast actual and potential scope of what intersects with law
can result in a sweeping allowance of speech grounded in such
pragmatics.321  As I have also noted elsewhere, the implementive
principle can independently ground degrees of allowance of322 due
process and equal protection necessary for rule implementation.323
Macro-implementives are thus a promising and important area of
pragmatics greatly in need of further exploration and elaboration.
X. CONCLUSION
“[T]he linguistic meaning . . . falls short of encoding what the
speaker means:  it merely helps the audience infer what she
means.”
–Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson324
“[W]ords are chameleons, which reflect the color of their
environment.”
–Justice Ginsburg (quoting Learned Hand)325
As this survey of pragmatics has shown, the writer’s meaning of a
text can differ from and even contradict a literal reading.  In its proper
320. To prevent confusion, I use in pragmatics the term “allowance of speech” in-
stead of the Constitutional term “freedom of speech.”
321. Let’s Skill all the Lawyers, supra note 319, at 35-43.
322. Again, I use the phrase “allowance of” to distinguish these pragmatic concepts
from Constitutional ones. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
323. Let’s Skill all the Lawyers, supra note 319, at 42.
324. DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION & COGNITION
27 (2d ed. 1996).
325. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015) (quoting Comm’r v. Nat’l
Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J., majority) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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context, for example, “Bob is indeed a good man” can ironically mean
just the opposite.  Additionally, even where coding is direct, most
words have multiple possible meanings, and we must therefore ex-
amine other evidence to determine the appropriate meaning unless we
wish to act arbitrarily.  Fortunately, texts exist in contexts that can
also serve as evidence of what a writer really intends or what (in the
case of texts by a group) might be the best reading of a text.
Good tools exist for interpreters who seek to determine a relevant
text and then ascertain its meaning.  Good interpreters use the cohe-
sion factors discussed above and the overall purpose of a message and
its communication to identify the relevant text.  For example, if an Act
is passed to increase affordable health care, a defensible selection of
“relevant text” in a review of the Act needs, if possible, to be broad
enough to avoid a ruling that drastically reduces affordable health
care.  Otherwise, one absurdly implements the opposite of what was
legislated.
After determining a relevant text, good interpreters examine the
applicable cognitive, physical, temporal, social, cultural, discursive,
textual, purposive, and policy contexts of the text.  They consider this
evidence in addition to the evidence of the text.  As they weigh their
evidence, they apply the principles of relevance and balance discussed
above.  That is, they assume that drafters mean to be relevant and
thus do not generally mean to draft wrongly, irrationally, or incoher-
ently even if their language can be interpreted as wrong, incomplete,
irrational, or incoherent.  Good interpreters also grasp the role of po-
liteness in communication and can thus grasp the indirect encoding
politeness may require.  They further understand that anaphora, cat-
aphora, ellipsis, and implementives can require looking beyond the
immediate text for the complete applicable message.  They also under-
stand the same can apply with deixis, presupposition, unstated prem-
ises, entailment, and other matters discussed in the Appendix.
Unless good interpreters have strong reasons directing them oth-
erwise, they thus strive to find a rational, and coherent meaning
where possible despite any textual encoding errors and despite unin-
tentional textual gaps, vagueness, ambiguity, or indeterminacy.  In so
doing, they do not confuse defective text with message.  Yet, they also
understand that text may be intentionally gapped, vague, ambiguous,
or indeterminate and they must weigh the available evidence to deter-
mine whether the message is gapped, vague, ambiguous, or indetermi-
nate as well.  In making any such judgment, they consider the
principles of relevance, balance, and politeness, as well as the context
and purpose of the text.  For example, in determining whether the
meaning of an intentionally-vague term such as “cruel and unusual
2016] LAW’S “WAY OF WORDS” 283
punishment” can evolve over time, good interpreters not only look at
the purpose of the notion but also assume that drafters generally
mean to be relevant and thus do not generally mean to draft wrongly,
irrationally, or incoherently.  They ask themselves how the phrase
“cruel and unusual” could be relevant if it does not prohibit what is
cruel and unusual at the time in question in addition to what might
have been cruel and unusual in the past?
Thus, seekers of the truth do not advance interpretive theories
that ignore pragmatics, that ignore how language works in the real
world.  Nor do they advance interpretive theories that lack relevance
to the real world.  As seekers of the truth, lawyers should not delude
themselves or judges with a textualism “that requires the judge to rely
on the text to the exclusion of other interpretive criteria, if the mean-
ing is ‘plain.’”326  As we have seen, meaning of text is never truly
“plain” in itself because it always depends upon its context.  Addition-
ally, as noted above, relevant text is never simply given but must also
itself be interpretively determined.  As Popkin notes, “Textualism
does not tell you how broadly or narrowly to define the text; . . . [or]
what context helps to decide textual meaning.”327  Such textualism
does not and cannot work, and seekers of the truth do not pretend
otherwise.
326. POPKIN, supra note 16, at 263.
327. Id. at 264.
284 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
XI. APPENDIX
OTHER PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGAL TEXTS
For those wishing to explore pragmatics in more detail, I set out
some further important pragmatic concepts below which may not be
as clearly tied to the ACA and other examples discussed above.  How-
ever, they are of no less importance than the pragmatic notions dis-
cussed above.  In the spirit of trying to provide lawyers with a single
initial reference for pragmatics, I outline these additional matters as
well.
A. PRESUPPOSITIONS
1. Semantic Presupposition
Have you stopped beating your wife?
In ordinary language, to “presuppose” is either “[t]o believe or
suppose in advance[,]” or “[t]o require or involve necessarily as an an-
tecedent condition[.]”328  Semantic presupposition involves the latter
sense, and is a “relation between two propositions, such that the pre-
supposing proposition can be denied, whereas the presupposed one
(the antecedent) is immune to negation[.]”329  For example, if I answer
a traffic citation by saying “my broken taillight did not make my driv-
ing dangerous,” that answer must presuppose “I had a broken tail-
light,” or I would not be making sense.  On the face of things, I could
not coherently affirm my driving analysis while denying the broken
taillight.  I could of course change my mind and negate the presuppos-
ing proposition.  For example, I could say: “On further thought, I guess
driving with that broken taillight was dangerous after all.”  However,
changing the evaluation of danger would not negate the presupposed
broken taillight.  I further explore in the next paragraph this impor-
tant fact about presuppositions.
Though defining “semantic presupposition” might at first seem
like mere academic hairsplitting, the concept is of great practical im-
portance.  In the case above, I effectively admitted that I had a broken
taillight.  To raise the stakes, imagine, for example, a paternity pro-
ceeding where an alleged father denies paternity.  In the course of the
proceeding, counsel for the other side alleges that the man “has
treated his son very badly.”  The alleged father only counters with:
“That is not true!  I have done him no harm!”  Negating the presuppos-
ing proposition does not negate the presupposed proposition that the
328. Presuppose, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1084 (3d ed. 1993).
329. C. Caffi, Pragmatic Presupposition, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS
759, 513 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
2016] LAW’S “WAY OF WORDS” 285
man is the father.  Without going further to negate the presupposed
proposition as well, the alleged father may have thus inadvertently
conceded the presupposed paternity.
This all ties into stasis, or issue theory, in rhetoric which recog-
nizes a progressive presuppositional issue line: (1) Sitne? (“Does it ex-
ist?)  (2) Quid sit? (“What is it?”) and Quale sit? (“What [quality] of
thing is it?”)330  To ask what something is (such as a certain plant
growing in one’s yard), on the face of things one concedes that the
plant exists.  To ask whether that plant is a useful one, on the face of
things one concedes that it is a plant and that it exists.  Recognizing
such a stasis line, a responder must carefully understand what he is
conceding when he responds, for example, that he was right to cut
down his neighbor’s trees because they were a hazard.  By making a
“Quale sit” assertion he has conceded the “Sitne?” and the “Quid sit?”
questions, i.e., whether he did something and whether that it was cut-
ting down his neighbor’s trees.331
B. PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITIONS
Pragmatic presupposition, on the other hand, involves the first
sense of “to presuppose,” i.e., “to believe or suppose in advance.”332  It
is a relationship between two propositions “whose truth/factuality is
taken for granted in a given context due to the mutual knowledge of
the speaker and the addressee(s).”333  Pragmatic presupposition in
this sense can be a useful umbrella term for context and for other
background considerations in general.334  For example, one neighbor
might email another: “Is the Victim alone today?”  Though that might
raise suspicions of criminal conspiracy in the mind of some textualists,
knowledge of the actual pragmatic presuppositions in play can show
no intended foul play.  If neighbors generally call one of their whiny
neighbors “the Victim,” they can pragmatically presuppose this use of
the term when they speak.  Of course, this example brings us back to
discourse context and context in general as discussed above in Section
VI.
C. ENTAILMENTS
“A word is dead, when it is said
Some say-
330. See LANHAM, supra note 96, at 93.
331. Id.
332. Presuppose, supra note 328.
333. Barabara Kryk-Kastovsky, Legal Pragmatics, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PRAGMATICS 513, 514 (Jacob. L. Mey & Keith Brown eds., 2009).
334. I will not explore other proposed definitions of “pragmatic presupposition” or
their claimed “short life.” See generally Caffi, supra note 329, at 763-67.
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I say it just begins to live
That day”
–Emily Dickinson335
“A Word dropped careless on a Page . . . .
Infection in the sentence breeds . . . .
At distances of Centuries
From the Malaria –”
–Emily Dickinson336
Propositions entail other propositions: “Lettie is a wonderful
sheltie dog” unavoidably entails that “Lettie is an animal.”337  It also
entails that Lettie is of the genus Canis, the family Canidae, the Or-
der Carnivora, the Class Mammilia, the Phylum Chordata, and the
Kingdom Animalia338 even if the speaker has never heard those terms
and cannot have meant to use or mean them.  Entailment expands
meaning because it can involve propositions and terms the speaker
does not know and therefore could not have intended but are nonethe-
less a part of the “meaning” of the statement.  In noting such extended
meaning, I accept Cruse’s definition of “entailment”: “To say that
[P]roposition P entails [P]roposition Q means that the truth of Q fol-
lows logically and inescapably from the truth of P, and the falsity of P
follows likewise from the falsity of Q.”339
Entailment is not merely an academic point for logicians to ex-
plore. Entailment necessarily can affect what is said and can even con-
tradict it.  For example, Jane Doe who has never read the Constitution
says: “I wish to run for Presidency of the United States.  We need new
blood in that office and I can give it.  As someone who is not a natural
born Citizen of the United States, no one is more qualified to run for
that office than me.”  Since she claims to be the best qualified to run,
she cannot mean in any way to say that she is disqualified.  However,
anyone who is not “a natural born Citizen of the United States” falls in
the class of persons ineligible to run for president.340  Her statement
on its face thus necessarily entails disqualification in the Constitu-
tional sense notwithstanding any other outstanding qualities that she
might have.  Though this would be a displaced sense of what she said
(since, again, it contradicts her very message), it would be a necessary
335. DICKINSON, supra note 296, at 124 (Poem No. 278).
336. Id. at 1872.
337. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 28.
338. Canis lupus familiaris, 1 MAMMAL SPECIES OF THE WORLD: A TAXONOMIC AND
GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE 2142 (Don Wilson & DeeAnn Reeder, eds., 3d ed. 2005)
339. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 28 (emphasis omitted).
340. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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one nonetheless.  Careful lawyers thus take great care evaluating
what their propositions entail.
D. UNSTATED PREMISES
Unstated premises of arguments can also serve as critical back-
ground and can thus be presupposed in the sense of believing or sup-
posing in advance.341  Since they are not written, they would not be
part of any text as I have defined that term in Section IV(B)(1)
above.342  For example, we might commonly say, “Since someone shot
the criminal, that criminal must be seriously injured by the bullet.”
To draw this conclusion, however, we need an initial premise such as
“If someone shoots another person, then that person will be seriously
injured by the bullet.”  Like other background matters, such unstated
premises can go unchallenged.  This presents the danger of incorrect
or undesirable conclusions being too quickly drawn from premises
that could be disproved if they were only consciously considered.  For
example, targets of guns are not always seriously injured—they may
have been wearing protective gear, an intervening piece of furniture
may have slowed the bullet to a non-dangerous speed when it hit, and
so on.
Additionally, as the following example shows, the unconscious na-
ture of premises can lead one to commit or not question logical falla-
cies even if the unstated premise is true.  For example, a prosecutor
drafting an indictment may say to himself, “The bullet injury leaves
no doubt that someone shot him.”  This will be fallacious reasoning if
it is based upon the unstated premise “If someone shoots another per-
son, then that person will be injured by the bullet.”  In that case, the
prosecutor would commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.343
Having a bullet injury could be explained in other ways: the person
shot himself, a gun accidentally fired of its own accord, or to take a
fantastic example perhaps an orangutan pulled the trigger.344  A care-
341. A classic example of this is an enthymeme, i.e., “[a] syllogism in which one of
the premises or the conclusion is not stated explicitly.” Enthymeme, AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 459 (3d ed. 1993).
342. Again, I define texts as “the original wording of written works, including with-
out limitation, constitutions, statutes, regulations, orders, contracts, wills, and other
documents and instruments.” See supra Section IV(B)(1).  Again, I would also consider
the term to cover, without limitation, literary and religious works as well as drawings or
diagrams within works.
343. See LANHAM, supra note 96, at 3.  That fallacy has the following form: If A then
B.  B. Therefore A.  The fallacy thus assumes the reverse premises of If B then A. See id.
344. It was after all an orangutan that wielded the razor in Poe’s The Murders in the
Rue Morgue. EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, in TALES OF EDGAR
ALLEN POE 249, 281-83 (Franklin Library 1979) (1841).
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ful reasoner will therefore wish to examine unstated premises not only
for their own sake but to examine how they are being used as well.
E. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
“Make not your thoughts your prisons[.]”
–Shakespeare, Anthony and Cleopatra345
Additional background matters include the frames we use and
what our concepts and metaphors stress, hide, and imply or suggest.
As I have written about these matters in detail elsewhere,346 I more
briefly address them below in this Appendix.
1. Applicable Frames
For purposes of this article, I give “frame” the ordinary sense of a
formulation using either concepts or systematic terms.347  Framing
can occur at multiple levels including delineating the matter(s) dis-
cussed (i.e., the reference(s)), formulating the issue(s) involved, and
formulating the applicable rule(s) so that we can then attempt to ap-
ply the rule(s) and reach a conclusion.348  For example, if we are talk-
ing about who owns a particular car, we will want to frame the car as
our reference, attempt to formulate the issues and rules involved, and
then attempt to apply the rules and reach a conclusion.  A good lawyer
will thus grasp a number of points about the importance of framing.
First, to have discourse about a particular thing, the parties must
be talking about the same thing, i.e., they must agree on their refer-
ence.349  They can’t be having a conversation about the same car if
they are referring to different cars.  This may seem an obvious point
but it actually can prove a real problem as when, for example, persons
fighting over a ring are not actually fighting at all.  After wasting
much effort, the parties fighting over a “ring” realize that one wants
only the band and the other wants only the stone.350
Second, frames are man-made, not given.  As in the above ring
example, the referent could be framed either as a “ring” or as “a band
with a stone.”
345. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, act 5, sc. 2, line 186 (New Pel-
ican 1698).
346. See Plane Meaning And Thought, supra note 31; see also Original, supra note
224; Lloyd, supra note 13.
347. See Frame, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 536 (3d ed. 1993); Id. at
540 (definition of “frame” involves definition of “formulation”).
348. See Plane Meaning And Thought, supra note 31, at 669-70.
349. Id. at 664-65.
350. Id. at 680-81.
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Third, background frames often float unconsciously and unchal-
lenged in the background.  In the ring example above, the parties were
likely framing the band and jewel as a ring without any thought that a
better framing might capture the real nature of their dispute.  Rather
than fighting over a “ring,” they might have earlier framed their mat-
ter as a question of who should “have” a “band” and who should “have”
a “stone.”  Good lawyers recognize both the flexibility, and often un-
conscious, background nature of frames.
Finally, good lawyers carefully think through framing possibili-
ties and try to use (and persuade others to accept) frames that best
suit the purposes at hand.  In the ring example again, a good lawyer
would have probed to find the real interests in the parties and would
have then chosen a frame of who gets the band and who gets the stone
(rather than who gets the “ring”).
2. Applicable Concepts and Metaphors
The concepts and metaphors that we use raise issues similar to
those addressed in framing.  As I have also written about these issues
in detail elsewhere,351 I will only briefly address them here.  Concepts
(“ring” vs. “separable-stone-and-band”) and metaphors are also man-
made and not given, can also float around unnoticed in the back-
ground, and should be constructed in ways that best fit the given
situation.352  Additionally, concepts and metaphors highlight and con-
ceal: they highlight common traits and conceal uncommon traits.353
The latter function of concepts and metaphors can be particularly
tricky if one is not aware of (or forgets) what is concealed and how that
might differ from reality.  For example, the old metaphor “time flies”
focuses on how time often moves rapidly like a bird.  One might think
of that old metaphor and, in a weak moment, go to a party hosted by a
bore knowing that “time flies.”  However, time can also creep, espe-
cially when one is bored.  Even the oldest, time-tested metaphor can
thus lead one astray.
F. DEIXIS
Referring expressions which require reference to a particular con-
text in order to make sense are generally called “indexical expres-
sions.”354  For example, “The President of the United States is
351. See id. at 686-91, 698-702, 711-24.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 688-89.
354. See PRAGMATICS, supra note 286, at 54.  C.S. Peirce examined indexicality in
detail and one can debate how this notion of an “index” squares with his thought (if his
thought fully squares at all). See, e.g, BOUISSAC, supra note 40, at 306-11.  For my un-
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speaking over there” cannot be understood apart from the physical
context to which “over there” refers.  Another sort of indexical expres-
sion would be where we attempt to point out something with our index
finger.355
These sorts of indexical expressions are often “designated by the
generic term deixis (a transliteration of the Greek . . . verb deiknumai,
“to show,” “to point”).356  Since the meaning of deictic expressions is
tied to the circumstances in which they are utilized, they have “no
referential autonomy” and are emptied357 of meaning apart from
those circumstances.358  A few of the many other words commonly in-
dicating such lack of “referential autonomy” are “I, you, here, and
now.”359  As I would use the term, Diexis can therefore involve anaph-
ora (which refers back in the ways discussed above) and cataphora
(which refers forward as noted above).360  Deixis comes in multiple
forms including those addressed below.
1. Personal Deixis
Deixis can be personal.361  For example, if I say, “He is seven feet
tall,” the personal reference has no meaning apart from the con-
text.362  If this person is already the subject of our discourse, we might
have anaphora by referring back to him.  However, if this is not the
case, we must look for other contextual clarification.  For example, I
might point to him as I am making the statement.363  In such a case,
given the need for personal deixis to assign the reference of “he,” the
text “He is seven feet tall” can have no “plain” meaning on its face.
derstanding of “index,” see Crushing Animals, Crashing Funerals, supra note 20, at 253-
56.
355. See Mey, supra note 17, at 790 (“the human forefinger is called ‘index’ because
it is our first and foremost natural pointing instrument[ ].”).  I do not mean to suggest
that we can determine reference merely by pointing. See Plane Meaning and Thought,
supra note 31, at 680.  For example, merely pointing in the direction of a violet cannot
alone fix a reference.  Am I pointing to the violet as a whole, to a particular leaf, to the
ground in which it grows, to the earth itself, and so on?  For those wishing to explore
further the means by which we fix reference, see CRUSE, supra note 27, at 392-407,
which discusses, among other things, the roles of describing, pointing, and naming in
fixing reference.
356. BOUISSAC, supra note 40, at 185.
357. I say “emptied” rather than “empty” of meaning since dictionaries will provide
general meaning for words like “there.”
358. See id. at 183.
359. See id. (italics omitted).
360. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 33.
361. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 402.
362. See PRAGMATICS, supra note 286, at 54.
363. See supra note 355 on the complexity of fixing reference.
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2. Spatial Deixis
Deixis can be spatial.364  Spatial deixis is found “principally in the
form of locative adverbs such as here and there, and [in such terms] as
this and that.”365  For example, if we are looking at a single book in a
store, the meaning of “Please give me that book” cannot be determined
apart from the spatial context.  Given the need for spatial deixis to
assign the reference of “that book,” the text “Please give me that book”
can have no “plain” meaning on its face.
3. Temporal Deixis
Deixis can be temporal.366  Temporal deixis locates “points or in-
tervals on the time axis, using (ultimately) the moment of utterance as
a reference point.”367  In English, the “most basic” temporal deictic
terms are “now” and “then.”368  For example, “Emma is singing now”
cannot be determined apart from the temporal context.  By “now” the
speaker could mean the day the speaker spoke, the day before, or
some other time.  Given the need for temporal deixis to assign the ref-
erence of “now,” the text “Emma is singing now” can have no “plain”
meaning on its face.
4. Conversational or Discourse Deixis
Deixis can be conversational.369  Conversational or “[d]iscourse
deixis refers to such matters as the use of this to point to . . . things
which are about to be said . . . , and that to point to past [things
said].”370  Simple examples include “Listen to this” (which points for-
ward) and “That was not a very nice thing to say” (which points back-
wards).371  More complex examples are not difficult to provide.  For
example, imagine that we have a transcript of a discourse on January
2 which says: “A: Thanks for warning me about what you saw yester-
day.  I saw one this morning, too.  B:  You’re welcome.  What are we
going to do?  A: Let’s just do what you suggested yesterday.  B: Good.
Let’s get to it.”  In addition to the need to assign the personal refer-
ences of “me,” “you,” and “I,” to assign any reference whatsoever to,
inter alia, “one” or “it,” we need to know the prior discourse.  Given the
need for both personal reference assignment and for discourse deixis
364. CRUSE, supra note 27, at 403.
365. Id. (italics in original).
366. Id. at 403-05.
367. Id. at 403.
368. Id. at 404.
369. See id. at 406 (discussing “discourse deixis”).
370. Id.
371. Id.
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to assign the references of, inter alia, “one” and “it,” this transcript can
have no “plain” meaning on its face.
5. Social Deixis
Deixis can be social.372  Social deixis refers to “relative social sta-
tus.”373  If we have a note from the 1600s which only says, “Thou art
early,” we know from Section VI(C) above that the use of “thou” as
opposed to you could be inappropriate and thus insulting in certain
social situations.  Without knowing the situation in which the writing
was made, i.e., without sufficient personal and social deixis, we cannot
know how to interpret either the personal or social dimension of that
meaning.  Given the need for personal and social deixis to assign the
reference and social meaning of “Thou,” the text “Thou art early” can
have no “plain” meaning on its face.
6. Deixis As Incompatible With Inherent Plain Meaning
To the extent text involves any of these types of deixis, a text can
therefore have no “plain” meaning in itself.  We cannot materially be-
gin to interpret “He,” “that book,” “now,” “one,” “it,” or “Thou” in the
above examples without first knowing what these words refer to.  In
all these examples, nothing in the text gives us the actual reference.
We may of course begin our interpretation process by looking at the
applicable text in each example.  However, the reference of each of
these deictic terms does not begin there, and we must promptly look
outside the text to determine that reference.
372. Id. at 405.
373. Id. at 405-06.
